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Abstract: 
This article engages with the 838-841/1435-1437 Anatolian adventures of the Mamluk amir 
Jānibak al-Ṣūfī. It demonstrates how Jānibak’s is a remarkable story full of meanings, which 
enable above all a more nuanced understanding of Mamluk engagements with southern and 
eastern Anatolia during the reign of sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (825-41/1422-38). First 
Jānibak’s whereabouts in Anatolia are reconstructed as they appear from contemporary source 
material on the one hand, and as they have been analysed in a handful of modern studies on 
the other. Against this historiographical background, a more comprehensive understanding of 
Jānibak’s role and significance is then being developed, combining local, Mamluk and 
Anatolian readings of Jānibak’s story into one integrated social network approach. This 
reconstruction of Jānibak’s social network in the Anatolian frontier zone finally leads to a 
number of conclusions on the complexity of political life in the 1430s in eastern Anatolia, on 
the nature of Barsbāy’s state, and on the shared realities of 15th-century political cultures in 
the Nile-to-Black-Sea area. 
!
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1. Introduction   1
For almost the entire sultanate of al-Ashraf Barsbāy, ruler of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt 
and Syria between 825/1422 and 841/1438, one of his less successful adversaries in the 
competition for the position of sultan in 824-5/1421-2, the amīr or military and political 
leader Jānibak al-Ṣūfī (d. 841/1437), continued to cast a remarkable shadow over the stability 
of his reign. Even in spite of Jānibak’s compulsory absence from the central scene of Mamluk 
politics throughout all these years —first as a prisoner and then as a fugitive—, contemporary 
sources refer to his case as one that was perceived as posing a direct threat to the stability of 
Barsbāy’s sixteen-year government. The latent tension between the royal court in the citadel 
of Cairo and one of its former members, active for more than a dozen years on a wide variety 
of places (Alexandria, Cairo, and various cities and towns in Syria and in southern and eastern 
Anatolia), has evidently received some attention in modern historiography. Nevertheless, this 
attention has mostly remained peripheral to that for other protagonists in the 1420s and 1430s, 
resulting in brief and conflicting generalisations rather than in any detailed analysis or 
insightful synthesis. As Barsbāy’s nemesis with a track record that connected Egypt, Syria and 
Anatolia into one eventful whole, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī is certainly entitled to more detailed 
research. His remarkable story on the wrong side of the sultan’s dispensation—although being 
physically chased away from the centre towards the fringes of Mamluk politics in 824/1421, 
he only disappeared entirely from court when he died many years later— is particularly 
interesting for furthering today’s knowledge of the complex relationships of power and 
authority that were emanating from Barsbāy’s court in Egypt and that were simultaneously 
existing in Anatolia. 
This article will develop a new and better appreciation of Jānibak’s story, presenting it as an 
interesting case for a more nuanced understanding of Mamluk engagements with Anatolia —
%  This article has been produced within the context of the ERC-project ‘The Mamlukisation of the Mamluk 1
Sultanate. Political Traditions and State Formation in 15th-century Egypt and Syria’ (Ghent University, 2009-14, 
ERC StG 240865 MMS). It was first conceived of and presented as a paper by Veerle Adriaenssens at the 
conference “Everything is on the Move: The Mamluk Empire as a Node in (Trans-)regional Networks”, 
Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg — University of Bonn, 6-9 December 2012; it has thereafter been expanded and 
transformed into the current article by Jo Van Steenbergen. Our thanks are due to Stephan Conermann, organiser 
of the Bonn conference, to the many conference participants, and to colleagues in the Mamluk History and 
Culture research group at Ghent University for helpful feedback and comments.
and vice versa— at the time of Barsbāy’s sultanate.   It will do so by first reconstructing in 2
some detail Jānibak’s whereabouts in Anatolia, between 838/1435 and 841/1437, as they 
appear from contemporary source material on the one hand, and as they have been analysed in 
a handful of modern studies on the other. A remarkable dichotomy in current understandings 
will become apparent, wavering between Jānibak’s presentation either as an active agent or as 
a passive puppet within a context that was either defined by Mamluk dominance or by 
Anatolian interests. In the main part of this article, we will therefore problematise these 
analyses and suggest instead a more comprehensive understanding of Jānibak’s role and 
significance, combining local readings with Mamluk and Anatolian ones in one integrated 
social network approach. This will then allow to draw some conclusions related to the 
enormous complexity of southern and eastern Anatolian political life in the 1430s, to the 
nature of Barsbāy’s authority, and to the shared realities of 15th-century political cultures in 
the Nile-to-Black-Sea area.  
%  It is argued here that a revision is due of some particular views of 15th-century Mamluk engagements with 2
Anatolia that remain quite persistent: at best, there is the perspective of the sultanate as an outsider to Anatolian 
political realities, who engaged with Anatolia only to construct a buffer to keep these realities out (see eg. Sh. 
Har El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East. The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 1485-1491 (Brill, 1995); too 
often, however, the Mamluk sultanate is just not considered to be an active part at all of the political landscape of 
Anatolia (see eg. the lack of any meaningful consideration of the Mamluk sultanate’s political involvement in 
The Cambridge History of Turkey. Volume I. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453, ed. K. Fleet [Cambridge, 2009], 
especially in the survey by R.P. Lindner, “Anatolia, 1300-1451”, pp. 102-117).
2. The remarkable career of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī: contemporary and modern understandings 
a. Life and career before 838/1435 
Until 824/1421, the career of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī unfolds as that of an exemplary high-profile 
member of Mamluk socio-political life at the beginning of the 9th/15th century. As did so many 
of his colleagues, Jānibak —allegedly of Circassian origins— began his career in the Mamluk 
sultanate as a young apprentice mamlūk of sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq (r. 784-802/1382-1399).   3
Under Barqūq’s son and successor, sultan al-Nāṣir Faraj (r. 802-815/1399-1412), Jānibak’s 
career still mostly remained under the radar of the period’s sources, but it nevertheless seems 
to have taken off very well, with promotions in the hierarchy of military commanders or amirs 
culminating in reports of his acquisition of the highest rank of amir of 100 and of his rise to 
lordly status at court.    This process was at first continued by the next sultan, al-Muʾayyad 4
Shaykh (r. 815-824/1412-1421), who appointed Jānibak in various high-ranking court 
positions.   In 818/1415, however, Jānibak was thrown into prison for unknown reasons, and 5
he was only released in 822/1418.    For the next two years, then, he remained in the 6
background, until in 824/1421, upon the accession of al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar (r. 824/1421), he was 
called back to the forefront of Mamluk politics and re-appointed to a high-ranking position at 
court.   Within a few months he was even appointed to the leading position at court of atābak 7
al-ʿasākir.   As a consequence, when the fatally ill sultan al-Ẓāhir Ṭaṭar was arranging his 8
succession from his deathbed, he entrusted Jānibak with the responsibility for the 
governmental management of his minor son’s reign, while nominating another leading amir 
from his entourage, Barsbāy, to act as the tutor of the young sultan.   In the power struggle that 9
ensued between these two leading amirs, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī was soon outdone by the charismatic 
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal al-Ṣāfī wa-l-Mustawfā baʿda l-Wāfī, ed. M.M. Amīn, vols. 1-13 (Cairo, 3
1984-2009) iv, p. 224.
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal, iv, p. 224.4
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal, iv, p. 224; al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Maʿrifat Duwal al-Mulūk, iv, ed. S.A. 5
ʿĀshūr (Cairo, 1972-1973), pp. 265, 285, 298; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira, 
xiv, eds. J.M. Muḥriz & F.M. Shaltūt, Cairo 1971, pp.8, 24; al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-jumān fī tārīkh ahl al-zamān: al-
ḥawādith wa-l-tarājim min sanat 815 h. ilā sanat 823 h., ed. A.Ṭ. al-Qarmūṭ (Cairo, 1985), pp. 205-206.
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk iv, p. 326, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, p. 34-35; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal, iv, p. 224; al-6
ʿAynī, ʿIqd, p. 232.
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 565; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, p. 172.7
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 578; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, p. 189, 192.8
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 587; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, p. 206, 211.9
Barsbāy and, after a brief clash between their supporters, Barsbāy had Jānibak captured and 
sent to the prison of Alexandria.   However, this detainment and the subsequent accession of 10
his opponent as sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy in early Rabīʿ II 825/April 1422 was not the end of 
it for Jānibak, nor for his vexed relationship with Barsbāy. Jānibak’s dim future took a very 
different turn in Shaʿbān 826/July 1423, when he almost miraculously managed to escape 
from prison.   The Mamluk court chronicler Ibn Taghrī Birdī explains this event and its 11
immediate and long-term consequences in a typically dramatised but insightful way: 
The sultan continued [to reign] while there was nothing at all to disturb him, until 
Friday the 7th of Shaʿbān (16 July 1423). [On that day] news reached the sultan that the 
senior amir Jānibak al-Ṣūfī had fled from Alexandria, from the tower where he had been 
imprisoned, and [that] he had left this frontier city without anyone noticing it. When the 
sultan heard this news, his soul almost expired, and he became furious. From this day 
onwards, he unleashed on the people distress, punishments, and attacks on households, 
which we will mention for the whole length of his sultanate. The life of al-Ashraf was 
disturbed from the day he learned the news, and he turned against a large group of his 
amirs, seizing them and banishing others accordingly.   12
In fact, all contemporary reports agree with Ibn Taghrī Birdī that even after almost two years 
in prison and without any substantial resources readily available to him, Jānibak continued to 
be perceived at court as a legitimate contender for the sultanate and as a direct threat to 
Barsbāy’s authority —or at least as a potential rallying point for opposition that could present 
such strong claims for a legitimate alternative to Barsbāy that it was considered a realistic 
threat. For many years after 826/1423, and in spite of very active searches, the only news that 
reached Cairo about the refugee Jānibak al-Ṣūfī consisted of rumours about his alleged 
whereabouts in Egypt, Syria and Anatolia; despite the vague and unfounded nature of these 
messages (or perhaps rather as a result of this frustrating obscurity), al-Ashraf Barsbāy 
remained extremely worried about a possible threat from Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and his agents, and 
he is claimed to have launched a true campaign of terror as a result. In this campaign, 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 591-592, 602; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, p. 213-220; Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, 10
Inbāʾ al-Ghumr bi-abnāʾ al-ʿumr (Beirut, 1986) vii, pp. 426, 432.
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 649, 947; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, pp. 253-4, al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd al-jumān fī tārīkh 11
ahl al-zamān, ed. A.Ṭ. al-Qarmūṭ (Cairo, 1989), p. 203.
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, pp. 253-4.12
Jānibak’s remaining family and former supporters were neutralised, and the slightest 
suspicion of sympathy for Jānibak was considered sufficient to get arrested, or worse.    13
For no less than twelve years, however, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī himself managed to find refuge and 
shelter well out of the Mamluk sultan’s (and his chroniclers’) reach. As a result the picture of 
his actual whereabouts remains very blurred. It seems that he eventually managed to find such 
refuge with local leaders in Anatolia. This is suggested most clearly by the fact that when all 
of a sudden in late 838/1435 very concrete information of Jānibak’s activities was presented 
to the sultan, he was revealed to having been residing for some time already with Isfandiyār b. 
Bayazīd (r. 805-843/1402-1439), the Türkmen local ruler of the Anatolian town of Sinop by 
the Black Sea.   This news, which was brought to Barsbāy by envoys from his governors in 14
the northern provinces of Aleppo and Daranda, was actually quite disconcerting: Jānibak 
turned out to be gathering his strength in Anatolia, and he had sent these two and many other 
governors and chiefs in the area letters inviting them to join forces with him.   After twelve 15
years of doubts and suspicions, it seemed finally clear what Jānibak was up to. 
!
b. The Northern Frontier Zone between Barsbāy, Murād Beg and Shāh Rukh 
As these references to Mamluk governors and Türkmen rulers suggest, the sudden re-
emergence of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī in Anatolia in 838/1435 was first and foremost a token of the 
eternal complexity of the constantly shifting and crisscrossing allegiances and authorities of 
local, regional, and trans-regional rulers in many parts of Anatolia. In the mid-1430s, this 
complexity coalesced into the competition of a handful of Türkmen leaders for access to land 
and resources and  —simultaneously— of the rulers of Cairo, Bursa and Herat for geopolitical 
hegemony and for local military and economic control. Between 820/1417 and 822/1419, 
while Ottomans and Timurids were slowly recovering from disruptive internecine warfare, in 
two military campaigns the Mamluk sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh had managed to restore 
Mamluk authority deep into south-eastern Anatolia, acquiring control over Divriği (Diwrikī) 
%  See the many references to continuous fear for Jānibak and to actions against his alleged supporters in al-13
Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 639, 648, 649, 654, 659; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xiv, pp. 257, 259-60, 263, 271, 278, 
286, 319, 321, 345, 353; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Nujūm al-Zāhira fī Mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira, xv, ed. I.A. Ṭarkhān, 
[Cairo, 1971], pp. 55, 60; al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, p. 203. See also A. Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, 
825-841/1422-1438 (Damas, 1961), pp. 23-25 for a summary of events and actions reported in this context.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 948; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 62.14
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 948-949; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 60-61.15
and Kayseri (Qayṣariyya). A Mamluk amir was installed as governor over the first region, and 
over the second a governor was appointed by the sultan from among the local Türkmen ruling 
family of Elbistan (Albulusṭayn) and Marash (Marʿash, today Kahramanmaraş), the 
Dulgadirids. This policy of Mamluk sovereignty and active representation in Anatolia —“of 
reward and coercion”, as Kellner-Heinkele put it  — was continued throughout the 1420s and 16
1430s, under Shaykh’s successor Barsbāy. Despite (or perhaps rather because of) increased 
effective interest in the southeast Anatolian region from the Ottoman ruler Murād Beg (r. 
824-855/1421-1451) in Western Anatolia and from the Timurid sovereign Shāh Rukh (r. 
807-850/1405-1447) in Iran and Azerbaijan, Barsbāy successfully managed to deploy a 
resourceful combination of diplomacy, representation and military campaigning aimed at the 
continued integration of Anatolian towns, citadels, caravan routes and Türkmen leaders into 
Cairo’s sphere of influence. Southern and eastern Anatolia’s main Türkmen leaders and their 
families and clans —from West to East the Karamanids of Konya, the Ramadanids of Tarsus 
and Adana, the Dulgadirids of Elbistan and Marash, and ʿUthmān Qarā Yülük and his sons, 
leading the Aqquyunlu tribal grouping and dominating the Diyar Bakr and Erzincan regions— 
all tried to deal with this in their own best interests, continuously pursuing their competing 
claims to Anatolian resources either by challenging their integration into the sultan’s orbit or 
by bringing their claims to court in Cairo.   17
This was the complex Anatolian arena in which Barsbāy’s old foe Jānibak all of a sudden, in 
late 838/1435, made his public re-appearance. It certainly was a dangerous arena, on the 
fringe of the sultan’s reach, but one that at the same time proved to offer unusual 
%  B. Kellner-Heinkele, “The Turkomans and Bilād aš-Šām in the Mamluk Period”, in Land Tenure and Social 16
Transformation in the Middle East, ed. T. Khalidi (Beirut, 1984), pp. 169-180: p. 172.
%  For general introductions into the topic of the Mamluk sultanate and Anatolia/Asia Minor in the first half of 17
the 9th/15th century, see Sh. Har El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East. The Ottoman-Mamluk War, 
1485-1491 (Leiden, 1995), pp. 27-79; A. Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, 825-841/1422-1438 
(Damas, 1961), pp. 363-402; Kellner-Heinkele, “The Turkomans and Bilād aš-Šām in the Mamluk Period”; P. 
Wing, “Submission, Defiance, and the Rules of Politics on the Mamluk Sultanate's Anatolian frontier”, JRAS (in 
press). See also relevant passages in J.E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire. Revised and 
Expanded Edition (Salt Lake City, 1999), pp. 43-71; C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1481 (Istanbul, 
1990); B.F. Manz, Power, Politics and Religion in Timurid Iran (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 34-45; R. Yinanç, “La 
dynastie de Dulghādir. De l’origine jusqu’à la conquête ottomane”, Dissertation (Paris, 1973), esp. pp. 76-112; 
M.L. Venzke, “The Case of a Dulgadir-Mamluk Iqṭāʿ: A Re-Assessment of the Dulgadir Principality and Its 
Position within the Ottoman-Mamluk Rivalry”, JESHO XLIII/3 (2000), pp. 399-474, esp. 421-423; S.N. Yıldız, 
“Razing Gevele and Fortifying Konya: The Beginning of the Ottoman Conquest of the Karamanid Principality in 
South-Central Anatolia, 1468”, in The Frontiers of the Ottoman World, ed. A.C.S. Peacock (Oxford, 2009), pp. 
307-329, esp. 311-316; S.N. Yıldız, “Post-Mongol Pastoral Polities in Eastern Anatolia during the late Middle 
Ages”, in At the Crossroads of Empires: 14th-15th Century Eastern Anatolia, eds. D. Beyazit and S. Rettig 
(Paris, 2012), pp. 27-48, esp. 35-38.
opportunities for someone like Jānibak. Those opportunities arose more precisely when, in 
838/1435, long-standing competition between Karamanids and Dulgadirids for control over 
the strategic town of Kayseri again erupted in a direct military confrontation, with substantial 
trans-regional repercussions. Since the days of Muʾayyad Shaykh awarding formal control 
over Kayseri was considered to belong to the Mamluk sultan’s prerogatives, so that Barsbāy 
and his representatives were almost automatically drawn into the dispute when representatives 
both of the Karamanid ruler Ibrāhīm Beg (r. 1423-1462) and of his Dulgadirid counterpart 
Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed (1399-1442) came to court seeking formal recognition. In return for 
promises of substantial tribute, Barsbāy sided with the Karamanids against the Dulgadirids. 
This Kayseri controversy moreover happened within a larger context of an expansionist 
Karamanid policy that was adopted by Ibrāhīm Beg in the mid-1430s, bringing the 
Karamanids of Konya also into direct conflict with their northern neighbours, the Ottomans. 
Sultan Murād Beg therefore took a similarly active interest in this local conflict on the 
Mamluk frontier, siding with the enemies of his enemies, the Dulgadirids. Finally, the 
mid-1430s witnessed renewed westward Timurid campaigning in Azerbaijan and east 
Anatolia, so that Shāh Rukh’s actions and other leaders’ reactions and anticipations had an 
equally substantial impact on the course of the Kayseri controversy.   18
From Shawwāl 838/May 1435 onwards, Kayseri was thus again controlled —with Mamluk 
approval— by Ibrāhīm Beg the Karamanid, while the Dulgadirid Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and 
his son Sulaymān tried to recapture their former possession in every possible way. This also 
generated numerous raids on other towns in the area, most of them under direct or indirect 
Mamluk control. Reported raiding parties were mainly led by Dulgadirids, but also involved 
other local leaders, especially the Aqquyunlu leader ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yülük (r. 
806-839/1403-1435) and some of his sons. All this resulted in Mamluk military campaigns 
being sent against the Dulgadirids and one Ottoman campaign against the Karamanids, and in 
the subsequent breakdown of Karamanid and Dulgadirid control over their core regions of 
Konya and of Elbistan respectively. By early 841/mid-1437, however, the increase of 
Ottoman involvement in the Kayseri controversy after Shāh Rūkh’s sudden retreat eastwards 
resulted in a settlement between the conflicting parties, restoring the pre-conflict situation for 
both Karamanids and Dulgadirids, and the general acknowledgment of Barsbāy’s suzerainty 
%  See Har El, Struggle for Domination, pp. 72-3; Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, pp. 392-7; Woods, 18
The Aqquyunlu, pp. 53-4; R. Jennings, "Kaysariyya", EI2, vol. IV (Leiden, 1978), pp. 842-6.
over both. A final Mamluk campaign in Ramaḍān-Dhu l-Ḥijja 841/March-June 1438—the last 
of Barsbāy’s reign— against the warring sons of Qara Yülük —who himself had died in Ṣafar 
839/August-September 1435 when summoned to offer assistance to Shāh Rukh— also once 
more restored the general acknowledgment of Barsbāy’s suzerainty over the Northern 
Euphrates area. Only when the news of the sultan’s death on 13 Dhū l-Ḥijja 841/7 June 1438 
reached his commanders in eastern Anatolian Erzincan did they end the campaign and return 
to Egypt.   19
!
c. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s whereabouts in the Anatolian Frontier zone, 1435-1438 
This situation of a rapid transformation and eventual restoration in southeast Anatolia of local 
and regional power balances between 1435 and 1438 was the context that offered Jānibak 
sufficient opportunities to re-emerge as a leading public figure. What exactly extant source 
reports say that happened to him will be reconstructed here;   an analysis of how and why it 20
happened —or was represented as such— will be considered thereafter. 
From his re-appearance in Ottoman Central Anatolia in late 838/1435 over his alliance with 
the Dulgadirid cause until his death in Aqquyunlu captivity on 26 Rabīʿ II 841/26 October 
1437, Jānibak got deeply engaged in the full complexity of the Kayseri conflict in a range of 
events that can be grouped into five separate phases.  
!
1) Shawwāl 838-Rabīʿ I 839/May-October 1435  
A first phase sees Jānibak emerging in Anatolia as a local leader, quite successfully generating 
support and followers across local Türkmen leaderships —from Ramadanids in the west to 
Aqquyunlu in the east— and engaging in profitable raiding in the Mamluk controlled 
Anatolian regions of Divriği and Malatya. This phase —very alarming from Barsbāy’s 
perspective— ended abruptly in betrayal. 
As mentioned above, in late 838/mid-1435, after many years of silence, very concrete 
information of Jānibak’s activities was again presented to the Mamluk sultan: he was revealed 
%  See Har El, Struggle for Domination, pp. 73-4; Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, pp. 397-9; Woods, 19
The Aqquyunlu, p. 68; Yinanç, “La dynastie de Dulghadir”, p. 102; Venzke, “The Case of a Dulgadir-Mamluk 
Iqṭāʿ”, p. 422.
%  This will be an extensive summary, presenting the story’s general line from extant Mamluk narratives sources, 20
as a framework for further analysis below (and explicitly not as a mere positivist reconstruction of any realities 
of Jānibak’s whereabouts); for an even more detailed reconstruction of the chronology of events as suggested by 
(Mamluk and other) narrative sources, see Yinanç, “La dynastie de Dulghadir”, pp. 102-111.
to having been residing for some time already with the Türkmen ruler of the town of Sinop,   21
and to be gathering his strength in the spring of 838/1435 in central Anatolia, sending 
Mamluk governors and Türkmen chiefs in Northern Syria and South-East Anatolia letters 
inviting them to join forces with him.   Several local Türkmen chiefs pledged their support   22 23
and around the same time, Jānibak also got the support from another refugee Mamluk amir, 
Qirmish al-Aʿwar, a brother-in-arms since many years who now suddenly re-appeared in this 
region.   With Qirmish, his personal followers and a handful of Türkmen chiefs, Jānibak then 24
moved south, eventually joining forces with the lord of the citadel of Çemişgezek (Qalʿat 
Jumurkasak), the Aqquyunlu Meḥmed b. ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yuluk, to raid the region of 
Mamluk controlled Divriği. At that moment, however, this course of local east Anatolian 
events was interrupted by the third and last Timurid campaign against Qara Qoyunlu Türkmen 
control over Azerbaijan, in the period 838-840/1434-6. The Aqquyunlu Türkmen leadership of 
south-east Anatolia—including Meḥmed— was summoned by Shāh Rukh to come to his 
assistance against their Qara Qoyunlu foe in the lake Van region. As a result, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī 
and his followers were left alone in the Divriği region, and they moved further south, heading 
for the strategic Mamluk town of Malatya.   25
In the meantime in the Mamluk sultanate, sultan Barsbāy reacted to the news of the Anatolian 
activities of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī by preparing his Syrian governors for action.   Barsbāy’s mind 26
was, however, set at rest when he received a letter informing him that Jānibak had been 
arrested. In the course of Jānibak’s siege of Mamluk Malatya, on 17 Rabīʿ I 839/10 October 
1435, he had been betrayed and captured by a son of the Dulgadirid leader Nāṣir al-Dīn 
Meḥmed. Before any of Jānibak’s followers had realised it, he had been taken in shackles to 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 948; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 62; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs wa-l-Abdān fī 21
Tawārīkh al-Zamān, ed. Ḥ. Ḥabashī (Cairo, 1973), iii, p. 333.
%  al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, IV, pp. 948-949, 959-960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 60-61, 66; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-22
Ghumr, viii, p. 369, 375-6; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 319, 320, 333.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 948-949, 960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp.62, 66, 67; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-23
Ghumr, viii, p. 340-1, 375-6; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 320, 333.
%   Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 960, 995; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 66-67, 205; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, 24
viii, p. 375; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 333; for a more detailed discussion of the strong bonds between 
Qirmish and Jānibak, see below, part 3/2.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 67; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, pp. 341, 375; 25
al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 320, 328, 333.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 961; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 63, 66; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 333.26
Elbistan.   When this news reached the Mamluk sultan, an envoy was immediately sent out to 27
ask for the extradition of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī.    28
!
2) Jumādā II 839-Rabīʿ I 840/December 1435-October 1436  
In this second phase, Jānibak encountered a rather unexpected supporter and partner in the 
Dulgadirid ruler Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed. Their joint challenge to Barsbāy’s authority resulted, 
however, in protracted Mamluk raiding and campaigning in Dulgadirid lands that all but 
finished Dulgadirid local leadership in southeast Anatolia. Meḥmed and Jānibak eventually 
finding shelter in Ottoman lands marks the end of this phase. 
Fortunately for Jānibak, already in Jumādā II 839/December 1435 his captor’s father decided 
to set his son’s prisoner free, even despite the arrival in Elbistan of a Mamluk envoy. When 
this envoy returned empty-handed to Cairo in Rajab 839/January 1436, Barsbāy’s court got in 
great turmoil, and it was decided to send north from Cairo an impressive military force of 
leading amirs and royal elite forces.   In Elbistan, meanwhile, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī was restored to 29
his former status as a regional leader, and he moved further south from Elbistan, towards 
Dulgadirid Marash.   Meanwhile, the troops marching north from Cairo were gathering in 30
Aleppo. Early in Ramaḍān 839/mid-March 1436, Barsbāy’s governor of this northern 
province already left for Anatolia with his own troops. In the end, these Mamluk troops 
moved further north than Marash, against Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed in Elbistan, who therefore 
fled the town with his followers. When the pursuit of Meḥmed and his band proofed futile, the 
abandoned town of Elbistan and its surrounding region were thoroughly looted and raided by 
the Mamluk army, taking everything they found with them to Aleppo and only leaving behind 
scorched and depleted lands. “Not a single keddah of grain was left in Abulustayn or its 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 67-8; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 342-3, 27
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%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 968, 970, 973, 974; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 75-6; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-29
Ghumr, viii, p. 377-8; al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, pp. 472-3; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 342, 344.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk,iv, p. 979, Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 78.30
districts”, the Mamluk sources claim, “It was burned and pillaged —both [the town] and its 
villages—, and it was left a barren plain”.   31
Upon this raiding army’s return to Aleppo, a combination of fresh Egyptian and Syrian troops 
took over and marched north, eventually taking up positions near Mamluk Gaziantep 
(ʿAyntāb), some 100 kilometres north of Aleppo. As Jānibak and his followers continued to 
move south, a confrontation became unavoidable. This happened on 24 and 25 Dhū l-Ḥijja 
839/9 and 10 July 1436, and after two days of fighting, Jānibak and his band of supporters 
were totally defeated. Most of Jānibak’s followers were captured, Jānibak himself only just 
managing to escape.    Defeated, bereft of supporters and resources, and hunted down by 32
raiding Mamluk troops, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed were obliged to flee ever 
further into Anatolia. When those troops finally gave up their pursuit near Sivas (Sīwās) in 
central Anatolia, arriving back in Aleppo in Rabīʿ I 840/September-October 1436, all they 
brought with them was more booty, and the news that Jānibak and Meḥmed had found refuge 
in Ottoman lands. Shortly afterwards, it would become known that together they had settled 
down near Ottoman Ankara (Ankūriyah).   33
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3) Jumādā I - Dhū l-Qaʿda 840/November 1436 - May 1437 
In this third phase —only known through brief allusions to reports arriving in Cairo — the 
region of Kayseri again became a bone of contention between Karamanids and Dulgadirids, 
when the latter —including Jānibak— received full Ottoman support and then returned to 
South-East Anatolia. This phase ended when the Ottomans concluded peace with the 
Karamanids. 
On 12 Jumādā II 840/22 December 1436, the message arrived in Cairo that the defeated 
Dulgadirids had found a powerful ally in the Ottoman sultan Murād Beg for the solution of 
their territorial disputes with the Karamanids. When as a result no less than three armies 
started their march from Ottoman lands towards Ibrāhīm Beg in Kayseri, Barsbāy in Cairo 
offered assistance to his Karamanid partner by “sending money and weapons to each of [his 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 979-80 (quote from p. 980); Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 78-9; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ 31
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%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 980-1; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 79-80; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 378, 32
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%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 996, 1003; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, pp. 414-5; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, 33
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governors] in Gaziantep (ʿAyntāb), Malatya (Malaṭiya), Kâhta (Kakhtā) and Karkar and 
[by] writing to the loyal Türkmen groups (Turkumān al-ṭāʿa) to aid Ibrāhīm b. Qaramān 
against his enemy.”   Further disconcerting news, however, arrived in Cairo some three 34
months later, on 10 Ramaḍān 840/18 March 1437: also Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed, his 
“partner” (nazīluhu) Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and their band of followers were reported to having 
joined the Ottoman march against “Karamanid territories”. In fact, it appears that from the 
region of Ankara they had managed to join forces near Kayseri with Meḥmed’s son and his 
Ottoman allies, participating in an attempt to recover control over the town. In Cairo, Barsbāy 
reacted eventually by instructing his Syrian governors to march north to offer assistance to 
Ibrahim Beg. By the time the governor of Aleppo reached Marash, however, it became known 
that the Karamanids and the Ottomans had concluded peace, settling their territorial disputes 
and ending two years of hostile activities between them. As a result, these Mamluks troops 
returned south and on 20 Dhū l-Qaʿda 840/26 May 1437 they were welcomed back in 
Aleppo.   35
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4) Muḥarram 841/July 1437 
From the perspective of Jānibak’s whereabouts the previous phase almost naturally flowed 
into this next, fourth one. What changed, however, was that these whereabouts again became 
much more localised, without any direct involvement from Cairo or Bursa. This phase ended 
in a renewed defeat and flight, and in Jānibak’s definitive separation from the Dulgadirids as a 
result. 
As the Dulgadirid siege of Karamanid Kayseri continued, Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and Jānibak 
al-Ṣūfī wandered south with a small band of followers, towards the scorched Dulgadirid 
heartlands which they had been chased from a year before. Their re-appearance did not go 
unnoticed, however, and on 15 Muḥarram 841/19 July 1437, their encampment —about two 
days travel from Marash— was attacked by “the [Mamluk] governor of Divriği … with a 
number of [Mamluk] governors of those districts, and others, numbering around two thousand 
horsemen, … [who] looted what was there and burned it”. Just as had happened a year before, 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 1003-4 (quote p. 1004); Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 418; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat 34
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Jānibak and Meḥmed were forced to flee, but this time circumstances made them to split up. 
Meḥmed managed to escape again towards Ottoman territories in the northwest, but Jānibak 
had to seek refuge in the other direction, eventually ending up in Aq Qoyunly territories with 
his former companion Meḥmed b. ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yülük and his brother Maḥmūd.    36
!
5) Muḥarram-Rajab 841/July 1437-January 1438 
In this fifth and final phase, Jānibak was once again betrayed —this time by his Aqquyunlu 
hosts— to Barsbāy’s agents; when he tried to evade capture he was mortally wounded and 
died. 
According to the most widespread version of the continuation of Jānibak’s story, Barsbāy’s 
governor of Aleppo managed to persuade Meḥmed b. ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yülük and his 
brother to capture their guest and to deliver him to him. But when they set up their trap on 
Friday 25 Rabīʿ II 841/25 October 1437, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī was informed and tried to escape. In 
the ensuing battle, however, he got hit by an arrow, fell from his horse and was captured 
nonetheless. Jānibak then turned out to be so badly hurt that he died the next day. When a 
representative of Aleppo’s governor came to collect Jānibak and pay Meḥmed and Maḥmūd 
their due, it therefore rather was his severed head that was exchanged for money. This head 
was then presented to the Mamluk governor, who immediately forwarded it to Cairo, where 
—much to the sultan’s delight— it was said to have been shown around on a spear in the 
city’s streets on 1 Jumādā I/30 October, and then thrown into a ditch. Some two months later, 
in early Rajab/January 1438, Jānibak’s sword reportedly also arrived in Cairo with a son of 
Maḥmūd b. ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yuluk. This ritual act, loaded with symbolism of Barsbāy’s 
victory and sovereignty, finally concluded Jānibak’s longstanding story on the fringes of the 
sultan’s authority, only a few months before the sultan’s own demise in Dhū l-Ḥijja 841/June 
1438.    37
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d. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s Anatolian whereabouts in contemporary and modern historiography 
The historical picture of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī in this volatile frontier zone of southeast Anatolia that 
emerges from Mamluk sources thus presents him as morphing from a rather successful 
military leader, gathering his strength with local and regional support and threatening Mamluk 
strategic strongholds such as Divriği and Malatya; over an unexpected Dulgadirid partner 
against Karamanids and Mamluks, continuing to cast his threatening shadow but bringing but 
little good fortune to the Dulgadirid cause; to a defeated refugee to Aqquyunlu hospitality, 
welcomed at first but then sold for gold coin to Barsbāy’s agents. In general, this 
contemporary Mamluk representation thus accorded a rather central and protagonist role to 
Jānibak. It pictures him as a leading public figure who was joined by some of the main rulers 
of the South-Eastern Anatolian regions and beyond in his subversive campaigns against 
Barsbāy’s sovereignty, to an aspired mutual benefit for Jānibak and his many partners, and to 
the greatest distress for Barsbāy’s court. This construction of a remarkable story of a Mamluk 
refugee amir’s sudden acquisition of effective and far-reaching political and military agency 
in South-Eastern Anatolia between 1435 and 1438 is shared by most contemporary Mamluk 
historians, and therefore certainly also by their audiences.   Their shared memberships of 38
Mamluk Cairo’s political and cultural elites at the time of these events suggests that this story 
at least represents the dominant way in which formal and informal messages and news about 
Jānibak’s whereabouts were received and perceived among these Mamluk elites, a dominant 
perception of Jānibak’s agency that was based on correspondence and eyewitness accounts 
reaching Cairo from South-Eastern Anatolia via Aleppo. 
As may be expected, modern reception of this Mamluk perception, as preserved in the only 
hitherto known source material for Jānibak’s case, represents a more mixed reading of this 
material. At the same time, however, there so far seems to have been no escape possible from 
the more or less one-dimensional approach to the issue of Jānibak’s agency. We still have to 
rely for detailed modern reconstructions of Jānibak’s story on the only modern history of 
sultan Barsbāy’s reign ever written, by Ahmad Darrag, which was published now more than 
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fifty years ago, in 1961, and on the equally detailed reconstruction of Dulgadirid history by 
Refet Yinanç, produced as a PhD dissertation in 1973.   Darrag’s reconstruction of Jānibak’s 39
story in particular is of interest here. It was interwoven in his detailed account of 
developments in the Anatolian frontier zone —“la frontière orientale”— at the time of 
Barsbāy, as part of a subchapter —“la coalition des ennemis de Barsbāy”— that describes in 
much detail how between 838/1435 and 841/1438 Barsbāy was forced to become more deeply 
involved than ever in Anatolian affairs. In Darrag’s view, this was all started by “a coalition” 
of his enemies, most importantly Shāh Rukh and his local agents: the Aqqoyunlu, the 
Ottomans, and the Dulgadirids. 
A la fin de 838/1435 se dressèrent contre l’Égypte à la fois Šāh-Ruḫ doublé de ses 
satellites, les Turcomans du Mouton Blanc et les Ottomans auxquels s’étaient ralliés les 
Ḏulqādirides. C’est alors que ses adversaires lancèrent dans la lice Ğānibak Ṣūfī. 
Cependant cette grave situation se dénoua heureusement pour elle grâce aux alliés 
occasionnels qui se présentèrent, grâce à la chance persistante qui sourit à son 
souverain.   40
Just as is illustrated by this passage, Jānibak appears from time to time in Darrag’s narrative, 
but only as a rather passive refugee who was used and also abused by Ottomans and others, 
who needed protection against his “mortal enemy” (son mortel ennemi) Barsbāy, and who 
should at best be considered an Anatolian adventurer (l’aventurier), unwillingly caught up in 
events that transcended him by far.    41
This instrumentalising understanding of Jānibak’s role, looking at him mainly from the 
perspective of how he was useful to Barsbāy’s opponents, has been quite influential, 
especially in some ‘Anatolian’ studies that picked up Jānibak’s case in their dealings with 
these opponents. In John Woods’ seminal work on the Aqquyunlu, Jānibak understandably 
hardly figures. But when he does, it is not just as Barsbāy’s “long-time archrival”, but also 
again as a “Mamluk rebel and adventurer”. Above all, Woods suggests, Jānibak’s short 
%  Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, pp. 392-9; Yinanç, “La dynastie de Dulghadir”, pp. 102-111.39
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%  Darrag, L’Égypte sous le règne de Barsbay, pp. 392-399 (It is interesting to note that in Darrag’s reading 41
Barsbāy’s final achievement through these and related events in the Anatolian frontier zone was total triumph 
and a maximum expansion of the frontier of his state) [see also the following footnote].
presence among the Aqquyunlu provided Barsbāy with the ideal excuse to send his third and 
final expedition against them; in reality, Woods explains, this had nothing to do with Jānibak, 
but rather was an attempt “to abet the Aqquyunlu Great Civil War by extending official 
Mamluk recognition to several factions simultaneously”.    A similar picture emerges from 42
Margaret Venzke’s 2000 survey of the Dulgadirid position “within the Ottoman-Mamluk 
Rivalry”: Jānibak may well have been a “Mamluk rebel and aspirant to the throne”, but he 
appears first and foremost as a useful tool for the Dulgadirids to challenge Barsbāy’s authority 
once they lost his support over Kayseri: “This [challenging] was seen in Meḥmed's harboring 
of the Mamluk rebel and aspirant to the throne, Emir Janibeg al-Ṣūfī. Worse than not handing 
Jānibeg over to Barsbāy as the latter had demanded, Meḥmed married him off to one of his 
daughters !”   In fact, considerations of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s story from a mid-15th-century 43
Anatolian historiographical perspective tend to deem it out of place, because primarily 
Mamluk, and therefore lacking any relevant historical agency within the Anatolian context; as 
such, it was even considered irrelevant to be included by Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, in her 
study of the formation of Ramadanid and Dulgadirid local leaderships, and by Shai Har-El, in 
his detailed exploration of fifteenth-century Ottoman-Mamluk frontier relations.   44
A handful of works of specifically Mamluk history, however, take a remarkably different 
approach towards Jānibak’s case. Unlike the example set by the pioneering contribution of 
Darrag, they adopt in the clearest terms a perspective of full and very decisive agency, 
furthering an understanding that —as explained above— Mamluk sources had already 
suggested for Jānibak’s activities. In one of the very few English-language surveys of 
Mamluk history published back in 1973, Sir John Glubb summarised Jānibak’s story as 
follows: 
Suddenly, in May 1435, Jānibak al Sufi appeared in Anatolia and wrote to the Qaraman 
Ameer [sic], to Ibn Dulqadir of Albistan and to Shah Rukh. The latter sent back robes of 
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1989], pp. 48-54).
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honour and urged all concerned to invade Syria. Janibek thereupon besieged Malatia. … 
On 9th July, 1436, Janibek with some twelve thousand men was defeated near Ain Tab, 
north of Aleppo, and in October 1437 he was killed. His death, the defeat of Qara Yülük 
and the humiliation of Shah Rukh’s ambassador, did much to restore Mamluke [sic] 
prestige.   45
This understanding of Jānibak’s leading role in these events is mirrored in André Clot’s 1996 
l’Egypte des mamelouks.   The same is also largely true for the much more specialist survey 46
of the region’s history in The Age of the Crusades, written by the Mamluk historian Peter Holt 
and published in 1986. In a much more nuanced approach to the extant source material, Holt 
also stressed Jānibak’s very active role in bringing about the southeast-Anatolian events of 
1435-8. Holt even claimed that “the arrival of Janibek in Anatolia brought together the 
individuals and groups opposed to Barsbāy and more generally to the Mamluk sultanate as 
such.” Briefly surveying “the threat from Janibek in the north” —from his alliances with the 
Aqquyunlu and the Dulgadirids over the confrontation at Gaziantep in July 1436 to his flight 
from Marash to the Aq Qoyunly— Holt concluded that his death in October 1437 delivered 
Barsbāy from no less than “the most dangerous of his enemies”.   47
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3. Towards an integrative approach: Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s ego network in the Mamluk/
Anatolian Frontier zone 
What to make out of these differing perspectives on Jānibak ? In the third and main part of 
this article, we will not try to engage in any futile argumentation in favour of one or the other. 
Rather, we wish to present a different, more nuanced approach, that tries to integrate these 
different perspectives and understandings into a more comprehensive analytical framework. 
Two related assumptions will be the starting point for this re-assessment. The first is the 
acknowledgement of the reality that throughout most of the fifteenth century, southern and 
eastern Anatolia remained a dynamic and permeable zone between Ottomans, Mamluks and 
Timurids, where by a kind of a process of imperial stretch the physical enforcement of their 
trans-regional authorities was limited and where as a result plenty of opportunities and 
strategies were available for local and regional leaders to manifest themselves against their 
subordinates, peers, competitors and overlords.   As a result, we need to operationalise the 48
fact that between 838/1435 and 841/1438 Jānibak was active in a frontier zone, on the 
constantly shifting fringe of competing Mamluk, Timurid and Ottoman spaces of power and 
authority. This means that we have to accept that in this enormous geographical area 
stretching between Timurid Iran, Ottoman West-Anatolia and Mamluk Syria, political 
instability, constantly changing sovereignties, and continuous competition for control over 
and access to resources defined the standards of power elites’ social practice, and that this 
created huge opportunities as well as dangerous pitfalls for local chiefs who wished to try 
their luck, for regional leaders who wished to pursue their ambitions, and for trans-regional 
leaders who wished to manifest their authority and expand their reach. For Jānibak, this 
means that we cannot neglect the fact that he should be also considered from a local Anatolian 
perspective, without at the same time forgetting that more than anything it was a trans-local 
%  This view of this Anatolian frontier zone in the first half of the fifteenth century —as a highly dynamic, fluid, 48
and permeable social space of multiple interlocking but not necessarily parallel political, economic and cultural 
interests, related in varying degrees of integration to multiple centres of political, economic and cultural 
activities in Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Iran— is actually diametrically opposed to Har-El’s 
conceptualisation of the same Ottoman-Mamluk frontier from a rather anachronistic territorial inter-statist 
systemic perspective (see Har El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East, pp. 1-8 [‘The Anatolian State 
System’], 27-59 [p. 28: “…the Mamluks’ buffer system around the landward Anatolian frontier…”]). For a very 
useful illustration of the complex and multi-layered processes of integration and secession at work in this frontier 
zone, see Patrick Wing’s study of sultan Barsbāy’s 1433 campaign against the Aqquyunlu, and especially his 
concluding remark “that different varieties of frontier existed simultaneously, and changed according to 
historical circumstances.” (Wing, “Submission, Defiance, and the Rules of Politics on the Mamluk Sultanate's 
Anatolian frontier”, p. 15).
high-profile Mamluk background that made him who he was, even in remote areas such as 
Sinop by the Black Sea. 
The second basic assumption which follows from this is that we need to accept the simple fact 
that the historical realities and perceptions of Jānibak’s case may have meant many different 
things to many different people at many different times and places. It is therefore extremely 
relevant to take into account who those different people were for whom Jānibak’s case may 
have been meaningful, and to see how these differing perspectives and the different 
relationships that tied them to Jānibak as a result can further understandings of this story. 
Most importantly for the purpose of this article, these two basic assumptions mean that 
conflicting assessments of Jānibak’s agency versus his non-agency can be reconciled by an 
exploration of the varied and interlocking social groups of agents that interacted in 
meaningful ways with Jānibak between 838/1435 and 841/1437, an interaction that coalesced 
into a complex and dynamic ego-network that was brokered by Jānibak’s agency and 
identity.   More precisely, this ego-network will be reconstructed through the prism of the 49
changing scale of the spatial realities (local, regional, trans-regional) in which it operated, 
three interrelated socio-spatial network perspectives that help to make more sense of Jānibak’s 
story, as well as of the different relational contexts in which it was constructed: a local or 
intra-regional Türkmen Anatolian perspective, an inter-regional Mamluk Anatolian 
perspective, and a trans-regional Anatolian frontier zone perspective. 
!
1. Jānibak as a power broker in Türkmen Anatolia 
From his appearance near Ottoman Tokat down to his last combat near Aqquyunlu 
Çemişgezek, the historiographical representation of Jānibak’s Anatolian adventures and 
connections come across as not necessarily different from those of local chiefs in the area. 
Just as these chiefs all did, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī basically used the interlocking opportunities 
offered by this political and military frontier zone —local autonomy amidst fluid trans-local 
%  An ego-network is a network consisting of an identified focal node (“ego”) and the nodes (= the other 49
individuals or groups) to whom ego is directly connected through a variety of ties (“edges”), appearing clearly 
irrespective of or in addition to the ties that may also directly connect the other individuals in the network (each 
of whom is the focal node, of course, at the centre of his own ego-network). See: Steve Borgatti, 
www.analytictech.com/networks/egonet.htm (consulted on 5/11/2013); see also Claire Lemercier “Analyse de 
réseaux et histoire”, Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine 52/2 (2005), pp. 88-112, esp. pp. 91-92.  
Brokerage refers to “a structural position or role in which an actor [in this case “ego”] makes transactions and 
resource flows possible between two other social sites” (K. Barkey, Empire of Difference. The Ottomans in 
Comparative Perspective [Cambridge, 2008], p. 10 [quote]; and more in general R.S. Burt, Brokerage and 
Closure: An Introduction to Social Capital [Oxford, 2005]).
sovereignties, direct access to resources that were beyond the physical reach of trans-local 
monopolies, and a readily available pool of experienced warriors that were not bound to trans-
local loyalties— to carve out a place for himself in this huge and hybrid social space.  
All reports agree that Jānibak never operated alone, that there were always people moving 
around through South-East Anatolia with him. Even in his final hours of freedom, on Friday 
25 Rabīʿ II 841/25 October 1437, when he was trying to escape from his Aqquyunlu hosts, 
Mamluk sources suggest that he only did so after “consultation with his companions (fa-
shāwara aṣḥābahu)” and that he fled “with some twenty horsemen from among his 
companions, so as to save himself (wa-maʿahu ʿishrūn fārisan min aṣḥābihi li-yanjū bi-
nafsihi)”.   It remains impossible to retrieve the actual identity of these “companions”, but the 50
fact that they were reported to having remained with Jānibak in this hour of need, when he 
had been obliged to seek Aqquyunlu shelter, suggests that there was a strong tie binding them 
to their leader’s cause. Another reference indeed suggests that these “companions” refer to a 
select personal retinue of “sworn brothers”: two months earlier, on 15 Muḥarram 841/19 July 
1437, when Jānibak and his Dulgadirid partner Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed had been camping near 
Marash, Mamluk sources again explain that “Ibn Dulghādir and Jānibak al-Ṣūfī were with a 
small group (nafar qalīl), because their main party (jumūʿahumā) had remained with the amir 
Sulaymān b. Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed, besieging Qaysariyyat al-Rūm (Kayseri).”   A small band 51
was all that had been accompanying them when they were surprised by an overwhelming 
majority of “[Mamluk] nāʾibs and their peers with about 2,000 horsemen”.   What is 52
important to understand from this is that it suggests that Jānibak had been leading others, next 
to those close “companions”, on his Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436 flight with Nāṣir al-Dīn 
Meḥmed deep into Ottoman lands and then on their Ramaḍān 840/March 1437 march back 
against Kayseri; these were probably a mixture of Dulgadirid and other troops and followers, 
put to work in the Kayseri-siege, while their leaders had gone out raiding or hunting in old 
Dulgadirid territories with a small selection of followers, who can only have been —indeed— 
their personal retinues. 
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 88; also al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 1023; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, ix, p.4.50
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 1018-9; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 84-5; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 392.51
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p.  1018; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 84; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 392.52
These troops and personal retinues, however, were only a tiny remainder of the much larger 
hosts that had been following the leaderships of Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and Jānibak al-
Ṣūfī before the two devastating Mamluk campaigns in the regions of Elbistan and Gaziantep, 
in the summer of 839/1436. Jānibak’s total defeat near Gaziantep and his escaping only just 
the arrest that befell most of his followers clearly was a turning point in his Anatolian career, 
as was also remarked by the contemporary Mamluk historian Ibn Taghrī Birdī: 
“From that day onwards, Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s case went downhill, after rulers and common 
people (mulūk wa-khalāʾiq) had been rallying to him; [this was] because of his ill 
fortune.”   53
Much more information is indeed known about the wide range of supporters that had been 
rallying to Jānibak’s cause before Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436. Already when he had been 
residing in Ottoman Tokat, many surely had been attracted by the appeal of a new and 
promising leadership, confirmed by the support from the Ottoman sultan Murād Beg’s 
representative in Tokat, and by the terror which was rumoured to be spreading among sultan 
Barsbāy’s agents in northern Syria and Anatolia.   Others were drawn in by a very pro-active 54
campaign of official correspondence from Tokat; the substance of one type of such 
correspondence is suggested by the summary of the first contact that was established between 
Jānibak and Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed in Elbistan, in Shawwāl 838/May 1435:  
“The dawādār of the amir Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and Meḥmed b. Kundughdī b. Ramaḍān al-
Turkumānī had arrived with Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed b. Dulghādir in Elbistan. They had 
made him swear that he would not hand over nor abandon Jānibak al-Ṣūfī in case he 
would come to him.”   55
Other types of such correspondence to lesser regional figures included more direct appeals for 
support, alliance or even subordination to Jānibak’s authority.   Whatever its actual nature and 56
faraway sources’ reconstructions of it, this soon turned out to be a very successful campaign, 
feeding many rumours in Mamluk lands about who was or was not part of Jānibak’s growing 
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 80.53
%  al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 320-1.54
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 948; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 62; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 340; al-55
Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 319-20.
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p.  66; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp.  959-60.56
Anatolian network of allies, partners, and subordinates;   most importantly, it resulted in the 57
build up of a substantial military force around Jānibak, eventually —by the time of these 
troops’ fatal attack on a Mamluk army near Gaziantep in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436— 
reaching a substantial size to Anatolian standards, assessed by Mamluk sources at “about 
2,000 horsemen”.   The wide variety of local participants in this new leadership project is best 58
illustrated in a summarising report by the contemporary Mamluk court historian Ibn Taghrī 
Birdī, who tried to capture this remarkable emergence and deployment of a highly diverse 
new Anatolian power network in the following sentences: 
“He appeared again in [the town of] Tokat in the course of Shawwāl of the previous 
year, I mean the year 838. Its ruler, ʾArkuj Pasha, took it upon himself to offer him 
support, so he honoured him, he provided him with gifts, and he wrote to Nāṣir al-Dīn 
Meḥmed b. Dulghādir, nāʾib of Abulustayn, to Aslamās b. Kubak, to Meḥmed b. 
Quṭbakī, to Qarā Yuluk, and to other Türkmen amirs like them to stand with him and to 
prepare to offer assistance to him. Thereupon, a large group rallied around Jānibak al-
Ṣūfī. He geared up, and departed with them from Tokat. […] He travelled from Tokat to 
the amir Meḥmed b. Qarā Yulūk, lord of the citadel of Jumurkashak. This Meḥmed 
honoured them and strengthened their ranks. Thereupon, they launched raids from there 
on the town of Divriği and they harassed its people and plundered its surroundings.”   59
From this and similar reports that provide at least a few more details about the individuals and 
groups that joined Jānibak’s ranks, there actually emerge three types of Türkmen participants 
in this new network, each more or less integrated into it in different ways and for different 
reasons. 
A first type concerned those that had accepted Jānibak’s leadership in unequivocal fashion, 
Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s “large group” of supporters, those who had rallied to Jānibak’s cause when 
he was in Tokat, or perhaps even already before, as well as those who had come to Tokat to 
also physically strengthen his ranks. Source reports have next to nothing to say about these 
rank-and-file whose chief Jānibak became, but most of them probably were of very mixed 
Anatolian Türkmen origins, surely also including at least some bands of Türkmen brigands 
%  Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, pp. 376.57
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 981; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 80; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 354.58
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 66-7; a less detailed version of the same report may be found in al-Maqrīzī, 59
Sulūk, iv, p. 960; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 333.
and freebooters hoping to benefit from their new leader’s actions. It may also be assumed that 
this first circle of subordinate anonymous supporters made up a majority among the great host 
of horsemen that rode with Jānibak in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436. At the core of this first, 
subordinate and anonymous Türkmen type of supporters in Jānibak’s Anatolian network there 
undoubtedly stood his afore-mentioned personal retinue: two or more dozens of personal 
bodyguards and sworn brothers who would stay with Jānibak up to the dramatic end of his 
adventures. “His dawādār” or master of the pen-box, mentioned above as representing 
Jānibak in the first negotiations with Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed, must have been a member of this 
close retinue, and so would have been other holders of similar household-positions of prestige 
in Jānibak’s entourage. By analogy with that dawādār, also the other representative in this 
important mission to Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed —referred to as Meḥmed b. Kundughdī b. 
Ramaḍān al-Turkumānī— must have been a member of that private retinue; nothing further is 
known about this Meḥmed, but his name suggests that it concerned a member of the Türkmen 
Ramadanid dynasty of Adana and Tarsus, who for unknown reasons was trying his luck way 
beyond his family’s homeland as a trusted member of Jānibak’s close entourage.   This 60
mainly Türkmen identity of Jānibak’s personal retinue and military household at the centre of 
the growing number of his Anatolian followers is finally also suggested by the fact that 
another envoy from Jānibak —sent in Shawwāl 838/May 1435 on a similarly important 
mission to Mamluk territories in northern Syria but intercepted and arrested by Mamluk 
authorities near Aleppo— was identified in source reports as “a Türkmen known as Meḥmed 
(rajul turkumānī yuqāl lahu Muḥammad)”.   61
Whereas these Türkmen followers were in a clear subordinate position to Jānibak’s 
leadership, a very different kind of relationships was established with Türkmen leaders and 
their followings in the region of South-Eastern Anatolia. For relationships established before 
Shawwāl 838/May 1435 with local rulers such as Isfandiyar, the Türkmen ruler of Sinop, and 
Yörgüç Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Amasya, information about what exactly connected 
them to Jānibak’s cause —apart from a general attitude of hospitality for a refugee Mamluk 
%  No further information has been found on this individual, and Yinanç also summarily identified him as 60
“Muḥammad fils de Gundoghdū de la famille Ramadān” (Yinanç, ”La dynastie de Dulghadir”, p. 103)
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 61; al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 47-8; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 319.61
grandee— remains wanting.   We are better informed, however, about the ties that were 62
created after the Shawwāl 838/May 1435 promotional campaign of envoys and letters sent 
from Tokat to Türkmen amirs such as —in Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s words— “Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed 
b. Dulghādir, nāʾib of Abulustayn, Aslamās b. Kubak, Meḥmed b. Quṭbakī, and Qarā Yuluk”. 
Almost each of these four has an interesting story to tell about the dynamic contours of 
Jānibak’s Türkmen network. 
The two characters that look least familiar in this list, and about whom almost no further 
information has been preserved, are Aslamās b. Kubak and Meḥmed b. Quṭbakī. For the latter 
Meḥmed, no further data could be retrieved, apart from the fact that Ibn Taghrī Birdī and his 
Mamluk colleagues indeed all linked him to a position of local Türkmen leadership in 
southeastern Anatolia.   Some better idea of what this type of leadership consisted of, may be 63
retrieved from the few more data that have been preserved for Aslamās b. Kubak. Although 
no biographical information has been preserved for Aslamās himself, there has for another 
member of his family, providing a much better insight into the position and status of this 
family in southeast Anatolia. This concerns the amir al-Ḥusayn b. Kubak al-Turkumānī, 
identified by Ibn Taghrī Birdī as “amīr al-Turkumān al-Kubakiyya”, leader of the ‘Kubak-
Türkmen’ group.   Several Mamluk source reports detail how, for several years and often 64
leading a mixed host of Türkmen and Kurdish troops, this Ḥusayn b. Kubak and his brother 
Sūlaw had been raiding and causing havoc in the region of Mamluk-controlled Malatya, even 
looting the town of Malatya itself on several occasions.   Eventually, Ḥusayn b. Kubak was 65
murdered in 821/1418, by order of sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh, as part of his Anatolian 
campaigns to restore Mamluk hegemony in the region.   Although they had been subdued by 66
%  In the case of the Ottoman governor of Amasya, Yörgüç Pasha, who also controlled Tokat, Yinanç suggests an 62
Ottoman geo-political incentive to counter Karamanids and Mamluks, claiming that “pour changer le sens des 
événements ils se servirent de Djānibak-Sūfī qui avait trouvé asile dans leur pays” (Yinanç, ”La dynastie de 
Dulghadir”, p. 102); although such an Ottoman interest is not unlikely in the first phase of Jānibak’s story, it is 
nowhere corroborated in any of the surviving source reports (see below for more details on this geo-political 
dimension, and the apparent lack of Ottoman interest in Jānibak for most of his story).
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 948, 960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 63, 66; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, 63
pp. 341, 375; according to al-Ṣayrafī they “belonged to the most important leaders of the Türkmen” (min akābir 
umarāʾ al-turkumān) (al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 320; repeated in Ibn Īyās, Badāʾiʿ al-Zuhūr ii, p. 162).
%  Ibn Taghī Bird, al-Manhal, v, p. 167; repeated in al-Sakhāwī, al-Ḍawʾ al-Lāmiʿ fī Aʿyān al-Qarn al-Tāsiʿ, s.e., 64
vols. 1-12 (Beirut, 1992), iii, p. 154 (nr. 586).
%  See eg. al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 317, 353, 404, 434, 473.65
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, pp. 472-3; Ibn Taghī Bird, al-Manhal, v, p. 168; al-Sakhāwī, Ḍawʾ, iii, p. 154.66
the assassination of Ḥusayn, the Kubak family’s leadership position over a local gathering of 
Türkmen groups in or on the fringes of the Malatya region seems to have continued. This is 
suggested by the fact that—at least in one version of the first phase of Jānibak’s story by al-
Ṣayrafī— Jānibak and his following only joined forces with Aslamās (and with Meḥmed b. 
Quṭbakī) when they were moving south from Divriği to Malatya, that is, when they were 
marching through Kubakiyya homelands.   This local leadership is also suggested by Ibn 67
Ḥajar’s phrase that it were “the amirs of Aslamās b. Kubak and of Meḥmed b. Quṭbakī” who 
had joined Jānibak’s ranks.   It is, finally, most clearly visible from the fact that Aslamās 68
suddenly appeared in Cairo in late Ramaḍān 839/April 1436, where he was duly rewarded by 
sultan Barsbāy for abandoning Jānibak at this crucial moment, just before the Gaziantep 
confrontation, and received Mamluk gifts and honours, after which —in Ibn Ḥajar’s words– 
“the sultan […] sent him back to his lands”.   This Aslamās clearly then represents another 69
type of participants in Jānibak’s network, a type that also encompassed his peer Meḥmed b. 
Quṭbakī and —according to Ibn Taghrī Birdī— “other Türkmen amirs like them”  : they were 70
some of the many small-time southeast-Anatolian Türkmen leaders that were active on the 
fringes of Mamluk suzerainty in an endless competition for opportunities, loyalties, and 
resources, who from Shawwāl 838/May 1435 onwards rallied with their personal retinues and 
troops around Jānibak; when the large-scale Mamluk campaigning of Ramaḍān-Dhū l-Ḥijja 
839/March-July 1436 erased any apparent prospect for new opportunities, Aslamās and 
probably also many of the other small-time chiefs like him —of whom, indeed, nothing 
further is heard— proved of very little use to Jānibak, and most of them returned to their 
previous activities in search for new opportunities in the area. 
Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s list includes two more names of Türkmen amirs in Jānibak’s network: 
“Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed b. Dulghādir, nāʾib of Abulustayn” and “Qarā Yuluk”. The Dulgadirid 
leader of Elbistan and the Aqquyunlu leader ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yülük have been introduced 
above as the dynastic leaders of regionally powerful Türkmen tribal confederations —the one 
emanating from the regions of Elbistan and Marash, the other from the Upper Euphrates 
%  al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, p. 333.67
%  Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 341.68
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 975, 976; Ibn Taghī Bird, al-Manhal, xv, p. 77; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 69
378; al-Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 348, 349.
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, pp. 66.70
region—, and throughout their long careers each of Meḥmed and ʿUthmān in his own ways 
enjoyed very mixed relations with attempts to extend Mamluk suzerainty over the lands they 
controlled. In terms of resources, manpower, and regional authority, these two leaders clearly 
were of a very different standing from that of small-time chiefs such as Aslamās. The ties that 
bound these regional leaders and their families to Jānibak’s cause also were of a far more 
complex nature than was the case for Türkmen amirs like Aslamās. They represent, therefore, 
a third type of Türkmen partners in Jānibak’s network. 
Relations with Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed in particular developed in peculiar and complex ways. 
As illustrated in a quote above, various sources agree that at first these relations were of a 
rather formalised and nominal nature, Meḥmed simply guaranteeing Jānibak’s agents “that he 
would not hand over nor abandon Jānibak al-Ṣūfī in case he would come to him.”   Soon 71
thereafter, in Rabīʿ I 839/October 1435, this formal acceptance of Jānibak’s Anatolian 
position by the Dulgadirid leadership seemed to materialise in real support, when near 
Malatya Jānibak’s group was strengthened by Nāṣir al-Dīn’s son Sulaymān and an alleged 
number of “150 horsemen”.   At first, however, this turned out to be a ploy designed to win 72
Jānibak’s trust, isolate him from his followers, capture him, and take him to Elbistan.   In the 73
longer run, when soon after their arrival in Elbistan Nāṣir al-Dīn undid his son’s actions and 
restored Jānibak to his leadership, this Dulgadirid double-dealing enabled the unexpected 
creation of a remarkably close partnership between Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and Jānibak, that 
was to last until Muḥarram 841/July 1437. Jānibak’s cause and that of Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed’s 
became inextricably connected, and wherever Nāṣir al-Dīn turned up throughout these twenty 
odd months —whether between Elbistan and Marash, in Ottoman lands, or in Karamanid 
territory— “his partner” (nazīluhu)   Jānibak and his followers were by his side. Actually, this 74
partnership was cemented at some point between Rabī I and Rajab 839/October 1435 and 
February 1436 by the marriage between Jānibak and Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed’s daughter 
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 948; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 62; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 340; al-71
Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 319-20.
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 960; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 67; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, p. 342; al-72
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Ṣayrafī, Nuzhat al-Nufūs, iii, pp. 334.
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Nafīsa.   By the time of the destructive Mamluk campaigning of Ramaḍān-Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/75
March-July 1436, the powerful reality of this relationship was expressed by the presence of 
“all the sons of Nāṣir al-Dīn Beg Ibn Dulghādir —except for Sulaymān—” in Jānibak’s army 
that marched on Gaziantep.   Its strength was then illustrated by the fact that even despite the 76
disastrous outcome of the confrontation near Gaziantep, the partnership between the two 
leaders —now on the run— was continued beyond Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436. Only in 
Muḥarram 841/July 1437, when their encampment in the Marash region was attacked by the 
Mamluk governor of Divriği, did their relationship end. Upon this new calamity, Ibn Taghrī 
Birdī explains, “Ibn Dulghādir started to hate him, and they separated from that day 
onwards”.   77
As seen above, at that particular moment, Jānibak sought refuge with the sons of that other 
regional leader of repute and status, the Aq Qoyunly ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yuluk. However, by 
Muḥarram 841/July 1437, ʿUthmān Beg had been dead for some time already, and his sons 
Meḥmed and Maḥmūd proved unreliable hosts, to say the least. Clearly, at this particular 
moment, there was no more reason for them to ally with Jānibak, and just as Nāṣir al-Dīn 
Meḥmed had done, and as Aslamās and his peers had done in the spring of 839/1436 already, 
they forsook him.    This act of betrayal was however not unanimously welcomed among the 78
new Aqquyunlu leadership, among the brothers of Mehmed and Mahmūd.   Most importantly, 79
it was not entirely consistent with previous Aqquyunlu policy vis-à-vis Jānibak’s cause. In 
fact, that policy mirrored the Dulgadirid leadership’s one far more than such an outcome 
would suggest. Although no direct information has survived, it is highly likely that the above 
mentioned Tokat correspondence to “Qarā Yuluk” concerned an initiative parallel to that to 
Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed. In this case too, the promotional campaign seems to have resulted in a 
formal expression of acceptance and nominal support for Jānibak by ʿUthmān Beg. This is at 
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least suggested by the fact that shortly after Shawwāl 838/May 1435, Jānibak joined forces 
with ʿUthmān Beg’s son Meḥmed —who would betray him some two years later— who 
“received them honourably and strengthened their [forces]”.   This active involvement of the 80
Aqquyunlu in Jānibak’s Anatolian network, however, came to a premature end when the 
Aqquyunlu were summoned north by Shāh Rukh and when ʿUthmān Beg died in the course 
of that campaign. In fact, it was only after the sudden disruption of this Aqquyunlu 
association that Jānibak entered into more active contact with the Dulgadirids. 
Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yuluk, as representatives of the third type of 
members in Jānibak’s network, display indeed a very particular sort of interaction with 
Jānibak’s leadership, which is very different from that of the other two types. Unlike Jānibak’s 
entourage of Türkmen followers and of small-time local chiefs, these regional leaders —
including also the ruler of Sinop and the Ottoman governor of Tokat— acted as patrons, or at 
best as partners, rather than as subordinates for Jānibak’s leadership project. As a result of 
this, they limited themselves to a symbolically empowering recognition of Jānibak’s status, 
followed only in second instance by active support, which was then however rather delegated 
to sons and other agents. In the Aqquyunlu case, the relationship was then cut short by other, 
bigger events. In the Dulgadirid case, the opposite happened and this relationship was 
maximised by a very different turn of events, which from Ramaḍān 839/March-April 1436 
onwards resulted in all but the annihilation of the Dulgadirid enterprise itself. 
Before that moment, however, as Ibn Taghrī Birdī rightly remarked, “rulers and common 
people (mulūk wa-khalāʾiq) had been rallying to [Jānibak]”  ; more precisely, between 81
Shawwāl 838/May 1435 and Ramaḍān 839/March-April 1436 an intricate three-tiered web of 
vertical and horizontal ties was knitted around the newly emerging leadership of Jānibak, 
consisting of a dynamic following of Türkmen warriors and small-time South-East-Anatolian 
chiefs, and of regional partnerships with Türkmen dynastic rulers, with the Dulgadirid Nāṣir 
al-Dīn Meḥmed in particular. Whatever the historical dynamics of this ego network of Jānibak 
al-Ṣūfī beyond Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436, its combination of horizontal ties with regional 
Türkmen rulers and of vertical relations of power with Türkmen followers and local chiefs, 
spread out over an area that stretched from Sinop in the North to Gaziantep in the South, 
%  Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 67; also al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 960; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ al-Ghumr, viii, pp. 341, 80
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demonstrates first and foremost how this Egyptian amir of Circassian origins was all but an 
outsider to Türkmen Anatolian realities.   Through this network, Jānibak’s leadership and the 82
ups and downs of its performance were deeply integrated into the Anatolian framework in 
which they were developing, and from this perspective, Jānibak’s full agency on the Türkmen 
Anatolian stage stands out from his active brokerage at the centre of that ego network. 
!
[figure 1: Jānibak’s Anatolian network - to be drawn !] 
Jānibak al-Ṣūfī + 
1. dawādar & personal retinue / 2,000? horsemen / Meḥmed b. Kundughdī / a Turkman 
knows as Mehmed 
2. Aslamas b. Kubak - Mehmed b. Qutbaki - Turkmen amirs 
3. Mehmed b. Dulgadir + sons - ‘Uthman Qara Yuluk + sons - Isfandiyar - Arkuj Pasha 
!
This full integration of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī and his leadership in their Türkmen Anatolian context 
emerges not just from the different types of Türkmen groups and actors that rallied around his 
cause. It also transpires from the type of actions that generated the transformation of these 
disparate groups and actors into one powerful cohort. In the best of Türkmen chieftainship 
traditions, between Shawwāl 838/May 1435 and Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436 in particular, 
ranks were closed behind Jānibak’s leadership, and income and resources were generated for 
his followers and their leaders, by their joint marching against Anatolian towns and their joint 
raiding of villages and local communities. At first, with Aqquyunlu support, “raids” (ghārāt) 
were organised against the fortified town of Divriği, “the people of which were gravely 
affected and the surroundings of which were looted (ḍāyaqū ahlahā wa-nahabū ḍawāḥīhā)”.   83
Then, they moved further south and laid siege to the town of Malatya (nazalū ʿalā Malaṭiya 
… wa-ḥaṣarū Malaṭiya), where their ranks were briefly strengthened by Dulgadirid 
%  For an insightful appreciation of these realities and of their coalescing into an empowering ego-network 82
around the successful brokerage of the first set of Ottoman leaders in West-Anatolia in the course of the 14th 
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Constraints, and Opportunities).
%  Al-Maqrīzī, Sulūk, iv, p. 960; also in similar wordings in Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Nujūm, xv, p. 67; Ibn Ḥajar, Inbāʾ 83
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warriors.   Upon the settlement of subsequent Dulgadirid differences, Jānibak “fell upon 84
Marash (nazala ʿalā Marʿash)”  . Finally, in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436, it was said that 85
“Jānibak and his followers agreed to make a raid on (ijtamaʿa Jānī Bak wa-man maʿahu an 
yakbasūhu)” Mamluk Gaziantep,   after which they were defeated and Jānibak only barely 86
managed to escape north. Throughout this first and second phase of Jānibak’s Anatolian 
whereabouts, and to some extent also thereafter  , the reality of his Türkmen network’s 87
activities as much as the representation thereof in Mamluk sources were clearly framed in 
violent actions and phrases that do not differ in any way from how any other local Türkmen 
chief was thought to perform and establish local authority: securing revenue for followers and 
supporters by raiding, looting, besieging and using violence. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī himself therefore 
was acting just as such a Türkmen chief, generating his authority from a full-scope local 
agency that emanated from and resulted in a complex ego-network of Türkmen partners and 
supporters, who closed ranks behind him, but only as long as his leadership appeared to 
guarantee them benefit. 
!
2. Jānibak as a power broker in Mamluk Anatolia 
As suggested above, this Türkmen context of supporters, partners and local violence, 
however, was not all that made for Jānibak’s case. In many ways, the above mentioned 
Mamluk source representations of Jānibak’s Anatolian activities could well just be interpreted 
as representing a framing in negative terms of the renewed public activities of someone whom 
dominant Mamluk circles had been made to think of as Barsbāy’s dormant nemesis ever since 
this sultan’s accession in 825/1422. In this respect, the contemporary court historian al-
ʿAynī’s representation of these events’ reception in Cairo is tellingly clear, when he referred to 
“messages that had come about the attack of the enemy and the destruction of the lands (al-
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akhbār allatī taʾtī min hujūm al-ʿadūw wa-fasād al-bilād).”   The framing of these Anatolian 88
activities with labels of social disruption and violence reveal then how Anatolia was indeed 
perceived in Cairo as a region beyond direct Mamluk control but within its sphere of moral 
responsibility, a distant frontier zone that at the very same time was in constant need of the 
preservation and restoration of social order by the sultan’s agents. More importantly, the 
framing of Jānibak’s activities from this perspective of the challenge to a Mamluk-guarded 
regional social order also reveals how —at least in the minds and thoughts of Cairo’s political 
and cultural elites— Jānibak operated not just in a context of Türkmen friends, followers and 
forays, but also on a Mamluk fringe. From this perspective of a specifically Mamluk liminal 
space and frontier zone, it were Jānibak’s Mamluk identity and especially the memory 
thereof, rather than his local chieftainship, that were considered meaningful and that added to 
his actions a layer of subversive meanings, in direct opposition to his former opponent for the 
sultanate, al-Ashraf Barsbāy. 
This Mamluk royal-centre-versus-subversive-periphery understanding of Jānibak’s Anatolian 
activities was not, however, just a matter of Mamluk historiographic rhetoric and political 
discourse. Underlying facts suggest that this operating of Jānibak in a specifically Mamluk 
frontier zone reflects another dimension of the historical reality of Jānibak’s story, which ran 
parallel to the Türkmen context and which was equally crucial for its proper understanding. 
As in the Türkmen case, this reality of the Mamluk frontier reveals itself best via the further 
analysis of Jānibak’s brokerage of an ego network, with an additional Mamluk type of 
members and an additional Mamluk layer of meanings equally meriting full attention. 
First, there is the unmistakable and simple fact of the north-south axis along which Jānibak’s 
actions between Shawwāl 838/May 1435 and Ramaḍān 839/March-April 1436 proceeded, 
from Sinop by the Black Sea, over Tokat in Central Anatolia, and Divriği and Malatya to the 
southeast, to eventually Gaziantep some 100 kilometres north of Aleppo (see figure 1: map). 
Whether real or not, an intention to target Mamluk Syria certainly was suggested by this 
physical course of the Anatolian whereabouts of Jānibak’s network, and in Mamluk Aleppo 
and Cairo subsequent reports surely triggered their being perceived as such.   This perception 89
of a direct threat to Mamluk regional interests was certainly also the result of the fact that the 
%  al-ʿAynī, ʿIqd, p. 472.88
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different Anatolian towns and regions that appeared (or were perceived) as the specific targets 
of Jānibak’s raids and sieges in this period —Divriği, Malatya, Gaziantep— all happened to 
be directly controlled by Barsbāy’s agents, whereas lands under local or regional Türkmen 
control all seemed to be left alone. The growing threat posed by Jānibak and his troops to 
Mamluk authority and suzerainty in this frontier zone in general, and to direct Mamluk 
control over and strategic interests in the wedge of towns, routes, basins, plateaus and 
mountain ridges between Dulgadirid and Aqquyunlu lands —the “Mesopotamian Marches 
(thughūr al-Jazīra)”  — in particular, was thus sourly felt by local Mamluk agents. To them, 90
and to their overlords in Cairo, it may well have looked as though Jānibak was pursuing a full 
takeover of Mamluk control over this strategic Anatolian zone, before moving further south. 
This Mamluk dimension to Jānibak’s actions was certainly not just a matter of geographical 
strategies, centre-periphery perceptions, or personal ambitions. It was also deeply connected 
to the composition of Jānibak’s ego network, which in fact included apart from its Türkmen 
participants a remarkable Mamluk element that suggested that at least by Ramaḍān 839/
March-April 1436, Jānibak’s Anatolian campaign had successfully merged with, or even 
transformed into, a full-fledged anti-Barsbāy Mamluk rebellion.  
In Ibn Taghrī Birdī’s description of key members of Jānibak’s ego network, quoted above, 
one, Mamluk element has so far indeed not yet been discussed. “The amīr Qurmush al-Aʿwar, 
one of the former muqaddams ʾalf in Egypt […] showed up with him”, Ibn Taghī Birdī 
explained, “and with all who had joined him —including the amir Qurmush— he travelled 
from Tokat.”   In this list —as well as in the reality of the network taking shape around 91
Jānibak— the amir Qurmush al-Aʿwar was awarded a central role as a key protagonist, who 
operated as a sort of right hand to Jānibak.   This amir Qurmush was claimed to having been 92
very close to Jānibak —in his biographical notice, Ibn Taghrī Birdī illustrates this bond by 
making him say that “I have carried Jānibak al-Ṣūfī on my shoulders in the Circassian 
homelands and I have raised him as though he was a son”;   Qurmush had joined Jānibak at 93
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Tokat in Shawwāl 838/May 1435 after many years of Syro-Egyptian experiences that 
paralleled those of his would-be son: a senior amir in Egypt, the one-eyed (al-aʿwar) 
Qurmush sided with Jānibak in 824/1421 and after Barsbāy’s victory he was removed to a 
position in Damascus, where, in 826/1423, he joined another unsuccessful revolt against 
Barsbāy’s leadership and then disappeared from the Mamluk radar — “it seems that he had 
been hiding in these regions”— for more than ten years, until he appeared again in Tokat to 
join his lost son Jānibak.    94
Qurmush, however, was not the only Mamluk veteran to join Jānibak. There actually was a 
fourth type of members in Jānibak’s network, consisting of another group that accepted his 
leadership in ways similar to how his Anatolian Türkmen accepted it. These members, 
however, all shared a very different, non-Anatolian background that was directly related to 
Jānibak’s Mamluk origins. Reporting about the fatal battle near Gaziantep in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/
July 1436, the contemporary chronicler al-ʿAynī (as his name indicates originally from 
Gaziantep!) consistently refers to a much wider Mamluk involvement:  
“the great battle with Qurmush the rebel (al-khārij ʿan al-ṭāʿa) and the amir 
Kumushbughā, from the amirs of Aleppo, who had deserted (tasaḥḥaba) and gone to 
Jānibak al-Ṣūfī. … God caused the defeat of Qurmush and his fellow turk and 
turkumān, getting him, Kumushbughā and a group of about thirty individuals from the 
turk caught.”    95
This passage suggests not only that Qurmush was perceived in Cairo as a leading figure in 
Jānibak’s entourage, but also that there were good reasons to believe that there were many 
dozens like him in that entourage: al-ʿAynī’s use of the common identifier turk, in clear 
contradistinction to Jānibak’s Türkmen followers, suggests that these indeed were renegades 
from the political and military elites of the Dawlat al-Atrāk, the Mamluk polity.   Most 96
prominent among these turk in Jānibak’s camp —and most suggestive for their renegade 
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turkumān)” (Ibn Taghrī Birdī, al-Manhal, iv, p. 228).
Mamluk origins  — was the ‘deserter’ from the milieu of Mamluk amirs in Aleppo, 97
Kumushbughā, identified by Ibn Taghrī Birdī as “the amir Kumushbughā, known as Amīr 
ʿAshara, one of the amirs of Aleppo, who had gone from Aleppo and rallied to Jānibak al-Ṣūfī 
long time before this date (Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436)”.   Having been —just as Jānibak and 98
Qurmush— a mamlūk apprentice of al-Ẓāhir Barqūq, this Kumushbughā al-Ẓahirī was said to 
have had a low ranking amir’s default career in the anonymous mass of “military ranks and 
governorates (imriyyāt wa-wilāyāt)” before going over to Jānibak’s side.    Apart from 99
Qurmush and Kumushbugha, none of the other turk in Jānibak’s entourage are further 
identified in any of the available sources, suggesting that they all were of lower rank and 
status than Kumushbughā. What is clear, however, is that they were by Jānibak’s side when he 
attacked Mamluk forces near Gaziantep in numbers sufficiently large to be noticed and 
reported, and that the majority of them shared Kumushbughā’s renegade status, for they 
included, as Ibn Taghrī Birdī remarked in the biography of Jānibak, “a group from the amirs 
of Aleppo and elsewhere [that] had fled to him (wa-kāna qad haraba ilayhi jumāʿa min 
umarāʾ Ḥalab wa-ghayrihā)” just before the Gaziantep confrontation.    100
Whatever their origins and reasons for joining Jānibak, what all these Mamluk members of 
Jānibak’s ego network clearly had in common was their antagonistic attitude towards 
Barsbāy’s authority.   Apparently, Barsbāy’s state was perceived as quite inhospitable by all 101
of them, and from the moment Jānibak’s project presented itself as a viable alternative that 
gradually came within reach due to its successful southward progress through ‘the 
Mesopotamian marches’, these outcasts from Barsbāy’s authority switched sides —”they all 
agreed to fight against al-Malik al-Ashraf”, Ibn Taghrī Birdī remarked  —, from Qurmush 102
who went to Tokat already in Shawwāl 838/May 1435, over Kumushbughā who joined some 
time later, to other amirs who came from northern Syria when Jānibak was camping near 
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Gaziantep, in Ramaḍān 839/March-April 1436. In fact, in the original letter writing campaign 
from Ottoman Tokat, also other members of Barsbāy’s political and military elites had been 
targeted, such as the afore-mentioned nāʾib of Daranda and even the nāʾib of Aleppo, the amir 
Qurqumās al-Shaʿbānī.   These attempts allegedly came to naught, with the interception of 103
these messages and the execution of Jānibak’s envoys.   But there are also source reports that 104
suggest that the anti-Barsbāy Mamluk element in Jānibak’s network may have been —or was 
at least perceived to having been— larger and more threatening than what materialised near 
Gaziantep in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July1436.    105
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Figure 2: Jānibak’s Mamluk network — to be drawn ! 
4. Qurmush al-Aʿwar 
5. Kumushbugha + other refugee amirs & mamluks 
6. na’ibs/local Mamluk agents? 
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In all therefore, the combination of an apparent spatial strategy developing in this Mamluk 
frontier zone with a coalition of old and new outcasts from Barsbāy’s polity gaining strength 
on the fringe of his authority, made that Jānibak’s activities were understood in Cairo in the 
clearest of anti-Barsbāy terms. This perceived threat would certainly also help to explain why 
a Mamluk reaction was not just left —as was more usual for local disturbances in this 
Mamluk frontier zone— for local agents of the sultan, for the governor of Aleppo in 
particular, to solve. Between Jumādā II and Shaʿbān 839/January and March 1436, substantial 
Egyptian forces, involving seven of Barsbāy’s most trusted amirs with their personal troops, 
“1,000 royal mamluks, and 1,000 soldiers from the ḥalqa”, were equipped in Cairo and sent 
up north.   Between late Ramaḍān and Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/April and July 1436, this full-scale 106
deployment of Barsbāy’s force in and near the northern Mamluk frontier zone indeed was 
successful in restoring Mamluk social order in the area, by defeating and breaking up 
Jānibak’s network, laying waste to Dulgadirid Elbistan, and then pursuing Jānibak and his 
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Dulgadirid partner Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed up to Sivas in central Anatolia. Most revealing for 
this Mamluk anti-Barsbāy dimension of Jānibak’s ego-network —at this Gaziantep 
confrontation in particular, and within the reality of the Mamluk frontier zone as much as in 
its perception at Barsbāy’s court— is the subsequent punishment of those from Jānibak’s 
Mamluk followers who were captured near Gaziantep. Once brought to Aleppo, they were all 
put to death, but the remains of Qurmush and Kumushbugha were subsequently given a 
treatment that is only reserved for —as al-ʿAynī indeed already suggested above— ‘rebels’ 
and ‘deserters’ who had been perceived as a true and realistic threat for Barsbāy’s royal 
authority, and whose defeat —as all source reports agree— had to be advertised in the clearest 
and most public of terms, in the periphery as much as in the centre of Mamluk power. Their 
heads were cut off, sent to Cairo, shown around in the city’s streets, and then publicly 
disposed of in the most humiliating of ways.   This Mamluk dimension and the shared 107
agency in it for Jānibak and his Mamluk supporters is surely most dramatically summarised in 
Ibn Taghri Birdī’s report of this Gaziantep confrontation and its aftermath: 
“The two sides collided, and there was a great battle between them, in which Jānibak al-
Ṣūfī was defeated. The amir Qurmush al-Aʿwar and the amir Kumushbugha Amīr 
ʿAshara —they had been the two wings that had carried [Jānibak’s] sovereignty (wa-
humā kānā janāḥay mamlakatihi)— and eighteen horsemen from Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s 
companions were captured. Jānibak was put to flight with some people, and the armies 
pursued them, but did not manage to catch up with them, so they returned. [The 
Mamluk commander] Khujā Sūdūn took Qurmush and Kumushbughā with their 
followers, he had them all enchained, and he led them to Aleppo. That was reported to 
the sultan in a letter that arrived in Ṣafar of the year 840 (August 1436). The messenger 
brought with him the head of the amir Qurmush al-Aʿwar and the head of the amir 
Kumushbughā Amīr ʿAshara, reporting that those who had been caught with them two 
had been put to death in Aleppo. The two heads were shown around in Cairo, and then 
they were thrown in the sewers by order of the sultan, and they were not buried. A 
message of gratitude and praise was sent to the governor of Aleppo and to Khujā 
Sūdūn.”   108
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3. Jānibak as a pawn in frontier Anatolia 
Jānibak’s activities, however, were not just fully integrated into their Türkmen contexts and 
meaningful, even acute, within a Mamluk context. The staging of Jānibak’s story also needs 
to be considered from a third, interlocking perspective: that of a multi-directional Anatolian 
frontier zone, where traditional Mamluk suzerainty was constantly challenged from and 
undermined by various and competing regional and trans-regional forces. Southern and 
eastern Anatolia surely were fully integrated as a dynamic frontier zone into the performance 
of Barsbāy’s sovereignty, in both discursive and coercive ways. But Jānibak’s story also 
demonstrates how different political centres in Anatolia and beyond simultaneously engaged 
with or attempted to draw closer this frontier zone, in this particular case using Jānibak’s 
position to challenge Barsbāy’s authority, on a regional as well as on a trans-regional scale. 
In the first instance, the different regional partners in Jānibak’s Türkmen ego network —both 
Aqquyunlu and Dulgadirid— did not just have mere local reasons to do so. It rather were 
Jānibak’s Mamluk background and his very concrete subversive meaning within the context 
of Barsbāy’s authority that made him useful, for allying with him equalled the public 
performance of a powerful act against Barsbāy’s suzerainty. Regional rulers such as Nāṣir al-
Dīn Meḥmed and surely also Qarā Yülük ʿUthmān Beg were very much aware of that 
dimension, as was Barsbāy. Jānibak certainly also tried to put this symbolic dimension of his 
role in Anatolia to best practice, but this proved more often than not beyond his control. 
Mamluk source reports provide most detailed information about how Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed 
tried to instrumentalise Jānibak in his strained relation with Barsbāy. Some time before the 
arrival of Jānibak on the scene, Barsbāy’s agents had intervened in a conflict within the 
Dulgadirid family for control over the town of Marash, and they had captured one of Nāṣir al-
Dīn Meḥmed’s sons and taken him to Cairo as a prisoner of the sultan; soon thereafter, 
another of Mehmed’s sons, Sulaymān, lost the town of Kayseri to the Mamluk-backed 
Karamanids.   Mamluk-Dulgadirid antagonism was thus on the rise, and with one of his sons 109
in a Mamluk prison, Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed had little room for manoeuvring. As a sort of very 
last resort, he sent his wife on a diplomatic mission to Cairo to try and obtain the release of 
his son and the return of Kayseri. When Jānibak’s envoys presented their master’s case to 
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Nāṣir al-Dīn in Elbistan, however, he saw an opportunity to create some more leverage in his 
negotiations with Barsbāy, and he therefore schemed with Sulaymān to capture Jānibak and to 
try and use him to strike a better deal with the Mamluk sultan.   “[Sulaymān] caught [Jānibak 110
near Malatya]”, the contemporary scholar Ibn Ḥajar summarised the continuation of these 
events,  
“and he took him along overnight until he entered Elbistan. He wrote to the governor of 
Aleppo informing him that he had captured him on the 17th of Rabīʿ I [839] (9 
November 1435), and he settled on his exchange for 5,000 dinar. The governor of 
Aleppo sent his letter on to the sultan in Egypt. But Nāṣir al-Dīn [Meḥmed] sent his 
envoy to his son Sulaymān, telling him to write to the lord of Egypt and inform him 
about this and to tell Jānibak that he had only laid his hands on him so as to obtain the 
release of his son Fayyāḍ. [Nāṣir al-Dīn] had not yet been informed of his release, until 
in the course of all this, [his wife] Khadīja and her son Fayyāḍ arrived [in Elbistan].”   111
Once it became clear to Nāṣir al-Dīn that his wife and son had safely returned from Cairo —
his son even in the capacity of Mamluk-appointed governor of Marash— and that Barsbāy’s 
support for Karamanid control over Kayseri was to remain unchanged, he almost immediately 
changed policy. Jānibak al-Ṣūfī was released and restored to his local leadership position, and 
bonds between them were —as mentioned above— strengthened through marriage. Nāṣir al-
Dīn Meḥmed thus openly joined ranks with a Mamluk refugee, whom Barsbāy’s court had 
continued to consider a rebel and an enemy ever since 824/1422. His anti-Barsbāy intentions 
were publicly confirmed when he sent back empty-handed the envoy Barsbāy had sent to 
Elbistan to take Jānibak to Cairo. 
“When [the amir Shādi Bak] arrived with Nāṣir al-Dīn Bak Ibn Dulghādir, he was 
honourably welcomed and the presents, gifts and money he brought with him were 
taken from him. Thereafter, Nāṣir al-Dīn Bak Ibn Dulghādir started to put the amir 
Shādi Bak off day after day, until the matter dragged on and it became clear to Shādi 
Bak that he would not be allowed [to take Jānibak to Cairo]. He spoke to him about that, 
and Nāṣir al-Dīn Bak offered as an excuse for not handing him over that he feared for 
being publicly condemned for that and that he had received letters from Shāh Rukh and 
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from other regional rulers pleading on [Jānibak’s] behalf, and all kinds of other stories 
like this. The only intention was of course to prevent him from [taking Jānibak]. Shortly 
afterwards, he released [Jānibak] and returned him to his previous position, which 
became even better [than before].”    112
It was against this background of crisscrossing opportunities offered by the Anatolian frontier 
zone that Nāṣir al-Dīn became an active partner in Jānibak’s ego network, participating with 
his sons in this local campaign that was gradually transforming into a full-fledged anti-
Barsbāy rebellion. As much as this may have suited the interests of Jānibak himself and those 
of his Mamluk partners, this movement certainly also agreed with the intentions of the 
Dulgadirid leadership to wrest themselves from Barsbāy’s frustrating suzerainty, “to abandon 
treating the sultan with flattery and to start thinking of the change of fortune (wa-taraka 
mudārāt al-sulṭān wa-ashghala fikr al-dawla)”, al-Maqrīzī explained, “because the rebellion 
of Jānibak had brought about something [that looked] wiser and more opportune [to pursue] 
(li-annahu qad jāʾa min khurūj Jānibak mā huwa adhā wa amarr).”    113
Despite the paucity of further information, it is very likely that the same was actually true for 
other regional partners in Jānibak’s Anatolian ego network, and that the Türkmen ruler of 
Sinop, the Ottoman governor of Tokat, and the Aqquyunlu leader ʿUthmān Beg Qarā Yülük 
all decided to invest one way or another in the anti-Barsbāy meanings that Jānibak happened 
to bring in their Anatolian midst. This is at least suggested from the only extant information 
for Jānibak’s dealings with one of these latter regional leaderships, in particular at the very 
end of his Anatolian adventures. As detailed above, by Rabīʿ II 841/October 1437 the 
Aqquyunlu Meḥmed b. ʿUthmān and his brother Maḥmūd succumbed to the pressures of 
Barsbāy’s governor of Aleppo and exchanged Jānibak —or rather his Anatolian frontier value 
as a challenge to Barsbāy’s authority— for the neat sum of 5,000 dinar.    However, their 114
brother Ḥamza was reported by al-Maqrīzī to have had very different plans.  
“When [Ḥamza] was informed of Jānibak’s stay with his brothers Meḥmed and 
Maḥmūd, he wrote to his brother Meḥmed [instructing him] to send him on to him, so 
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as to intimidate the sultan with him (li-yurahhib bihi al-sulṭān). But Meḥmed preferred 
the promises of money that had been made by the governor of Aleppo and he killed 
Jānibak. Ḥamza then did not stop making his brother promises and awakening his 
desire, until he came to him, thinking that he would give him control over one of his 
towns. But as soon as [Meḥmed] came within [Ḥamza’s] reach, he killed him.”   115
Just as Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed two years before, Ḥamza b. Qarā Yülük (d. 848/1444), ruler of 
Mardin and Erzincan and the ascending successor to Aqquyunlu general leadership, saw an 
opportunity in Jānibak’s sudden appearance in Aqquyunlu lands to boost his campaign to re-
negotiate the nature of Barsbāy’s suzerainty. This did not materialise, however, due to his 
brothers’ more pragmatic concerns for resources, nor did Ḥamza’s wider anti-Barsbāy 
campaign bear any real fruits for him. It rather resulted in a last deployment of Barsbāy’s 
military apparatus in the Anatolian frontier zone between Shaʿbān 841 and Muḥarram 842/
February and July 1438, in Mamluk intrusions deep into Aqquyunlu lands up to Erzincan, and 
in the ritual submission of several Anatolian local and regional leaders —including Ḥamza 
himself— to Barsbāy’s suzerainty.     116
Barsbāy’s troubled relationship with the Anatolian regional leaderships of the Dulgadirids and 
the Aqquyunlu and the way that Jānibak’s anti-Barsbāy meanings were —or were at least 
aspired to be— operationalised within that relationship thus ran very parallel courses, even in 
their outcomes of another reconfirmation of Barsbāy’s suzerainty in this Anatolian frontier 
zone, by his successful deployment of violence and symbolic communication. As the 
Aqquyunlu case suggests, however, this built up of tension in the Anatolian frontier zone did 
not just revolve around Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s case. Transcending this by far was the continuous 
negotiation over the physical and symbolic frontiers of Mamluk authority in Anatolia between 
these regional leaders and Barsbāy’s court, and in this negotiation Jānibak al-Ṣūfī was just one 
of those instruments that could offer the former considerable leverage. 
This symbolic value of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī in the Anatolian frontier zone as Barsbāy’s accessible 
nemesis was not just picked up by regional leaders such as Nāṣir al-Dīn Meḥmed and Ḥamza. 
It was also operationalised by trans-regional leaders, especially when they appeared to pursue 
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an extension of their authority in that frontier zone and attempted to challenge Barsbāy’s 
traditional suzerainty over it. As mentioned before, this concerned the actions of the Ottoman 
ruler Murād Beg and, in particular, of the Timurid leader Shāh Rukh. 
In the Ottoman case, any allusions to Murād Beg’s appreciation of Jānibak’s frontier value 
remain very indirect and speculative. As seen above, it was mainly the Ottoman governor in 
the city of Tokat whose support and promotional campaign enabled the re-appearance of 
Jānibak as an Anatolian chief,   and after his defeat at Gaziantep in Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 117
1436, it was in Ottoman lands that Jānibak found shelter against his Mamluk pursuers as well 
as renewed support to return to the Anatolian frontier zone.   As a result, Mamluk historians’ 118
representations of the reception at Barsbāy’s court of this news indicate that Ottoman actions 
involving Jānibak were considered as aimed against the heart of Barsbāy’s authority, 
generating concrete plans to make the sultan himself march up north and face the enemy.   119
However, whereas in the Tokat case it is highly likely that Murād Beg was involved one way 
or another in his governor’s engagement with Jānibak, in the other case there is nothing in the 
sources to suggest the same. Stripped of most of his Anatolian and Mamluk supporters, 
Jānibak simply had no option but to follow his Dulgadirid partners as long as they endured 
him, and the fact that Murād Beg did not operationalise his symbolic value during the joint 
Ottoman-Dulgadirid military operations against the Karamanid leader Ibrāhīm Beg only 
suggests that this value was not really picked up in the Ottoman camp, or at least that it was 
simply not considered worth the Ottoman trouble. This also transpired in Cairo, where any 
plans for the sultan’s personal engagement in military operations in Ramaḍān 840/March 
1437 were quickly forsaken. The peace treaty concluded shortly afterwards between Murād 
Beg and Ibrāhīm Beg and the subsequent Ottoman retreat northwards confirmed that, 
whatever the original Ottoman interests in Jānibak, this had not been a campaign against 
Barsbāy.    120
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Things were somewhat different with Shāh Rukh, who used the opportunity of his Azerbaijan 
campaign to try and extend his authority in truly Timurid universal rule style over the entire 
eastern Mediterranean. This plan became first known in Cairo when, “in Ṣafar 839/September 
1435, the news arrived with the sultan”, Ibn Taghrī Birdī reported, “that Shāh Rukh, the son 
of Tīmūrlank, had sent robes of honour to sultan Murād Beg b. ʿUthmān, the ruler of Rūm, to 
the amir Ṣārim al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Qaramān […], to Qarā Yülük and his sons, and to Nāṣir al-
Dīn Beg b. Dulghādir, making them his governors in their realms.”   This was perceived as a 121
direct challenge to Mamluk suzerainty in the Anatolian frontier zone, a perception that proved 
true when messages arrived that Shāh Rukh had taken Tabriz. The challenge turned out to be 
even greater when in early Rajab 839/January 1436, an envoy from Shāh Rukh is reported to 
have appeared in Cairo with another robe of honour, this time for Barsbāy himself, to become 
the Timurid ruler’s “governor of Egypt”. Enraged and humiliated by this bold diplomatic 
gesture, Barsbāy is said to have sought to set up an alliance with Murād Beg against Shāh 
Rukh, but this was cut short by Shāh Rukh’s sudden return eastwards in Shawwāl 839/April 
1436, and the subsequent disappearance of his threat to Barsbāy’s authority and suzerainty.   122
It was in fact in the midst of this built up of trans-regional tension with Shāh Rukh that 
Jānibak re-appeared in the Anatolian frontier zone, and that, in Rabīʿ al-Ākhir 839/October 
1435, it became known to Barsbāy that Jānibak too had been the object of correspondence 
from the Timurid ruler. At that time, a most disconcerting intercepted letter was forwarded 
from Aleppo to Cairo, in which Shāh Rukh “incited Jānibak al-Ṣūfī to take the Syrian lands, 
and [he promised him] that he [=Shāh Rukh] would send to him his son Aḥmad Jūkī and [his 
leading military commander] Bābā Ḥājjī to assist him fighting the sultan of Egypt.”   If this 123
letter and its representation in Mamluk sources were at all genuine, it seems that Shāh Rukh 
hoped for much more than merely operationalising Jānibak’s Mamluk values and meanings in 
the Anatolian frontier zone. In this case, the Timurid ruler intended to also operationalise 
Jānibak’s ego-network of Türkmen and Mamluk partners and followers, and to generate or at 
least to enhance its gradual transformation into a full-fledged anti-Barsbāy revolution, aiming 
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for Jānibak’s full take over of Barsbāy’s political project in Shāh Rukh’s name, first in Syria, 
and then also, with Timurid assistance, in Egypt. Among Barsbāy’s entourage at least, the 
coinciding of Shāh Rukh’s emergence from the east with Jānibak al-Ṣūfī’s in the Anatolian 
frontier zone was perceived from such a hugely threatening perspective. 
For Jānibak al-Ṣūfī himself, this perspective of the Anatolian frontier zone shows how he also 
got caught up in events that transcended him by far, and how regional and especially trans-
regional rulers also attempted and even succeeded to patronise him and his ego-network in 
their negotiations with and challenges to Mamluk suzerainty. In many cases, this certainly 
enhanced Jānibak’s cause and enabled him to maximise his ego-network, so that in the course 
of its existence it consisted not just of a variety of partners and followers, but also of a 
succession of powerful patrons. At the same time, the nature of these patrons’ interests never 
really —or at best only temporarily— coincided with Jānibak’s, so that in the end he and his 
supporters were more than once victimised rather than supported by their policies. In many 
ways, even the meanings attached by Barsbāy’s entourage to Jānibak’s Anatolian whereabouts 
and the resulting extremely forceful Mamluk military reactions, especially in Ramaḍān-Dhū l-
Ḥijja 839/March-July 1436, can also be considered an unwelcome function of this type of 
patronage, as they were certainly partly also brought about by trans-regional interests such as 
those that were imposed upon Jānibak’s campaigns. 
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[figure 3: Jānibak’s frontier network - to be drawn !] 
Jānibak al-Ṣūfī + 
3. Mehmed b. Dulgadir + sons (Sulayman) - ‘Uthman Qara Yuluk + sons (Hamza, Mehmed, 
Mahmud) 
7. Murad Beg - Shah Rukh - Barsbay (neg.) 
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In the Anatolian frontier zone, where interests and authorities of regional and trans-regional 
rulers were in a continuous flux, their negotiation, challenge and establishment took on a 
variety of forms and applied a plethora of strategies and tools, often difficult to evade and 
even more difficult to control for local leaders such as Jānibak. The only constant factor in 
this process at the time of Jānibak’s emergence, however, remained the imperial reach of 
Barsbāy’s suzerainty, established through symbolic means when possible, and through violent 
force when necessary. Jānibak’s mixed adventures with Ottoman, Aqquyunlu, Dulgadirid, and 
Timurid patrons, and with Mamluk opponents, are certainly also a token of that.  
4. Conclusions 
The relatively rich historical and historiographical texture, and the multiple local and trans-
local socio-political dimensions of Jānibak’s whereabouts between 838/1435 and 841/1438 
invite for some concluding observations on the meanings of this particular case, for 15th-
century participants and observers as much as for modern understandings, of the Mamluk 
sultanate and of late medieval southern and eastern Anatolia in particular. A somewhat 
surprising, but very revealing way into such observations is offered by the much better known 
case of Jem Sulṭān, the brother of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512). More than 
four decades after Jānibak’s adventures, Jem brought to Mamluk Egypt trans-regional 
meanings and interests that are not just quite well documented in a variety of sources, but that 
are also thought-provoking in their parallelism with Jānibak’s earlier whereabouts in Anatolia. 
Arriving in Cairo in early Shaʿbān 886/the last week of September 1481, Jem was welcomed 
with receptions, feasts, and eventually also an audience with sultan Qāytbāy (r. 1467-1496). 
In fact, having just been defeated by his brother in a violent confrontation over the succession 
to the Ottoman throne, Jem Sulṭān put the Mamluk sultan in an awkward position vis-à-vis 
Bayezid. Especially when Jem Sulṭān began planning a new campaign to marsh against his 
brother and to try and wrest the Ottoman throne from him, he put the Mamluk sultan in what 
has been termed by Ralph Hattox a “diplomatic dilemma”.   After defeating Jem Sulṭān a 124
second time in 887/1482, Bāyezid’s relationship with the Mamluk court, which had welcomed 
his rebel brother and given him a free hand to marsh again, got increasingly strained. 
According to the contemporary Egyptian historian Ibn Iyās, allowing Jem to leave again was 
“a capital mistake” (ʿayn al-ghalaṭ) that gravely weakened the Mamluk position.   When 125
Jem Sulṭān appeared shortly afterwards as a refugee in Rhodes, his host, the Grand Master of 
the Order of the Hospitallers, followed, as Ralph Hattox concludes, a very different but far 
more productive course of policy from that of the Mamluk sultan: 
Only two years earlier the Hospitallers had been beleaguered in their island fortress by 
Mehmed’s troops. Here now was a tool which, if used properly, would ensure their 
security, and few scruples about offending Bayezid restrained them. They did allow 
themselves to be convinced —for a price— by Bayezid’s envoys to remove Cem to 
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Europe. There he was passed among European princes, the carefully-watched house 
guest of several courts, until his death in 1495. For Christendom, he was a guarantee of 
Bayezid’s good behavior; as long as the threat existed that he could be put at the head of 
an army and sent east to claim his throne, Bayezid dared not raise his hand against the 
West. For the next twelve years the Ottoman advance against Christendom was halted. 
With any serious campaigning in Europe precluded, Bayezid had not only the time but 
now the predisposition to direct his attention against the Mamluks.   126
Possessing widely acknowledged but frustrated claims to the throne, used as an effective tool 
against the sultan, appearing at a variety of courts, and exchanged for money, this well-known 
fate of Jem Sulṭān surely reminds of the story and fate of Jānibak al-Ṣūfī as it has been 
analysed here. Just as Jem Sulṭān in the 1480s and 1490s, the Mamluk amir Jānibak was a 
defeated contender for the sultanate whose value as a potential threat to the sultan was 
operationalised between 838/1435 and 841/1437 in a variety of expansionist struggles with 
that sultan, by himself, by Mamluk rebels, by Dulgadirid and Aqquyunlu regional leaders, and 
by Ottoman and Timurid rulers. Due to his personal background and history, Jānibak too was 
a tool that could provide leverage against the sultan. This dialectic royal quality generated 
valuable meaning to his person and status, a precious symbolic capital that was appreciated in 
south-east Anatolia and beyond, that enabled the construction and reconstruction of a personal 
network of patrons, partners and followers in south-east Anatolia, that caused great concern in 
Cairo, and that only disappeared when he died in 841/1437. When Jānibak’s severed head was 
finally shown around in Cairo, in Jumādā I 841/early November 1437, “the souls became at 
rest”, the leading contemporary scholar Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī commented, “and whoever 
experienced the obstruction of his desire befell an intolerable sadness, for the epic battle was 
discontinued and the lies of those who had fabricated them became evident.”   From this 127
perspective of Jānibak’s substantial impact on Mamluk elite circles, the marriage of Barsbāy’s 
successor, sultan al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq (r. 842-857/1438-1453), to Jānibak’s former Dulgadirid 
wife Nafīsa bint Nāṣir al-Dīn Mehmed in 843/1440 can be explained as an act of 
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reconciliation with the Dulgadirid leadership, but also as a belated act of closure of this 
symbolic threat and long-standing political fissure, a final re-integration of any remnant of 
Jānibak’s supporters.    128
Above all, the striking parallel between the stories of Jem Sulṭān and Jānibak al-Ṣūfī informs 
about the particular nature of Mamluk socio-political culture in 15th-century Cairo. As one of 
the sons of the former Ottoman sultan, Jem Sulṭān’s legitimate claims to rule and its general 
acknowledgement inside and outside Ottoman domains are easily explained. Not being related 
by blood or marriage to any of the previous Mamluk sultans, Jānibak’s situation is at first 
sight a very different matter. Nevertheless, the general acknowledgement of his legitimate 
claims to rule inside and outside Mamluk domains never seem to have been a matter of any 
concern for his contemporaries. In his case, it seems that his Mamluk pedigree paralleling 
sultan Barsbāy’s —from his origins in Circassia, over his being a mamlūk of sultan Barqūq’s 
household, to his high profile leadership position with Barsbāy’s predecessors, sultan Ṭaṭar 
and his son— awarded Jānibak with the same credentials to rule as Barsbāy’s, and as Jem 
Sulṭān’s in the Ottoman context. In the Ottoman case, as with Bayezid and Jem Sulṭān, male 
members of the ruling Ottoman family indeed had equal claims to rule, and one of them only 
acquired the sultanate by demonstrating in Turco-Mongol monarchic fashion his leadership 
qualities by emerging victoriously from a violent confrontation with the other contenders for 
the throne.   In Cairo, this practice of Ottoman fratricide—combining refined ancient 129
ideologies of divine intervention and dynastic fortune with a brutal selection of military 
leadership capacities— clearly was adapted to Mamluk realities, so that the contours of the 
legitimately ruling clan were extended to include individual Mamluk leaders such as Jānibak, 
Barsbāy and their peers.   As a rule of thumb in Mamluk as much as in Ottoman succession 130
practices, new sultans better made sure to fully neutralise such brothers and peers before they 
could pose any more threats to their authority. 
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In the Mamluk case, Barsbāy clearly failed to do so when Jānibak managed to escape. 
Jānibak’s symbolic meaning as a legitimate contender for the Mamluk throne —if only he 
could beat Barsbāy in battle!— therefore remained intact throughout all the years of 
Barsbāy’s reign, and Barsbāy remained very much aware of that. Eventually Jānibak was even 
able to capitalise again on this symbolic value of his Mamluk person, generating the complex 
ego-network of patrons, partners and followers that was described above and that operated on 
various levels of spatial interaction. Inside Anatolia, it allowed Jānibak to transform into a 
local chief over a variety of Türkmen partners and followers, deeply engaged in local resource 
generating activities. In the Mamluk frontier zone, increasingly dominant anti-Barsbāy 
interests and followers transformed this still growing ego-network into a full-fledged anti-
Barsbāy rebellion, spreading fear for a total loss of control over Anatolia and northern Syria. 
On the local level and to a large extent also in the Mamluk context, Jānibak’s agency appears 
as quite considerable, as was also picked up in a handful of modern studies from the Mamluk 
perspective. These activities of Jānibak were however time and again cut short by Barsbāy’s 
agents, and by repeated impressive displays of Barsbāy’s authority and force deep into the 
Anatolian frontier zone. Despite the almost total loss of patrons, partners and followers after 
Dhū l-Ḥijja 839/July 1436 as a result, it was mainly the high symbolic value of his Mamluk 
person that enabled Jānibak to linger on as before, to retain at least some of that agency, and 
to continue to be perceived a real threat at Barsbāy’s court, until his violent death. 
Paradoxically, it is especially on the spatial level of the Anatolian frontier zone, in the direct 
competition between Barsbāy and other regional and trans-regional rulers, where that high 
symbolic meaning was highest valued, that Jānibak’s fate was left for others to decide. When 
non-Mamluk regional and trans-regional players engaged with Jānibak’s meaning, this was 
always done in an attempt to expand their own authorities, and to square Jānibak, his Mamluk 
value, and his ego-network, with their own interests. This is the perspective that seems to 
have informed the more dismissive attitude towards Jānibak’s story in modern ‘Anatolian’ 
historiography. Being of more use alive than dead, Jānibak was quite safe in this Anatolian 
frontier zone, but he lacked any real agency on this level of trans-regional interaction, and if 
the Aqquyunlu leader Ḥamza would have had it his way, Jānibak might well have ended up, 
just as Jem Sulṭān four decades later, as “the carefully-watched house guest of several courts”. 
!
[figure 4: Jānibak’s eg-network - to be drawn !] 
Jānibak al-Ṣūfī + local Türkmen / regional Türkmen / Mamluk agents / trans-regional rulers 
1. dawādar & personal retinue / 2,000? horsemen / Meḥmed b. Kundughdī / a Turkman 
knows as Mehmed (vert. household relationship / vert. war relationship) 
2. Aslamas b. Kubak - Mehmed b. Qutbaki - Turkmen amirs (vert. war relationship) 
3. Mehmed b. Dulgadir + sons - ‘Uthman Qara Yuluk + sons - Isfandiyar - Arkuj Pasha (hor. 
patronage relationship / hor. household relationship / hor. war relationship) 
4. Qurmush al-Aʿwar (vert. household relationship) 
5. Kumushbugha + other refugee amirs & mamluks (vert. war relationship) 
6. na’ibs/local Mamluk agents? (hor. war relationship) 
7. Murad Beg - Shah Rukh - Barsbay (vert. patronage relationship / hor. war with 
relationship) 
!
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Apart from issues of agency and non-agency, of ego-networking, and of surprising 
parallelisms between Mamluk and Ottoman political culture, a final conclusion that imposes 
itself on this analysis of Jānibak’s activities has to do with their Anatolian dimension. 
Throughout most of his Anatolian adventures, Jānibak’s leadership appeared as fully 
integrated into its Türkmen context, in terms of the nature of his partners and followers as 
well as in terms of the activities in which they were all engaged. More importantly, perhaps, it 
may also be argued that the same actually applies for Barsbāy’s leadership, even despite all 
the framing involved in the centre-periphery perspective that was imposed by an almost 
exclusively Egyptian historiographic tradition. Barsbāy’s engagement by proxy with these 
Anatolian events—through his governors in northern Syria and Anatolia, or through trusted 
military agents sent from Cairo— is certainly an illustration of the successful formation of 
Barsbāy’s state, in which royal representatives were entrusted with the effective performance 
of the sultan’s authority and in which the chains of royal agency and authority emanating 
from the court were increasingly complex. The perseverance of the performance of that 
authority even in the remote and permeable Anatolian frontier zone, and even despite 
impressive challenges from regional and trans-regional rulers throughout the 1430s, is then an 
even stronger token of the successful formation of Barsbāy’s state, cut short only by this 
sultan’s sudden death in Dhu l-Ḥijja 841/June 1438. There was a continuous presence of 
Barsbāy’s state in Anatolia, with his own agents acting as effective governors in Anatolian 
towns up to Divriği, with a selection endorsed by himself of regional and local Türkmen 
rulers east and west of the Gaziantep-Divriği wedge, and with his Syrian and Egyptian troops 
campaigning and raiding on a regular basis in ways that were not unfamiliar to local 
Anatolian practices. Despite all the differences in the continuously negotiated nature of their 
integrations into Barsbāy’s state, they all jointly enhanced a closely directed Mamluk access 
to Anatolian resources. Above all, Barsbāy’s troops’ ability to march deep into eastern 
Anatolia, even up to Sivas or Erzincan , and more generally the acknowledgement of the 
value of Jānibak’s anti-Barsbāy-meanings in most Anatolian towns and encampments, all 
testify to the fact that not just Jānibak’s was an Anatolian story as much as a Mamluk one, but 
above all also that the Mamluk sultanate, and in this case Barsbāy’s state in particular, were 
no Anatolian strangers, outsiders or intruders. Instead, they were deeply integrated into and an 
integral component of 15th-century Anatolian history, and vice versa !  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Figure 1: Map of main towns, cities, routes and geographical markers  
in 15th century southeastern Anatolia and Syria 
(source: Har El, Struggle For Domination in the Middle East, p. 46) 
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